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Infants are born able to express their emotions, and they can
synchronise their expressions with their mothers' acts. They are coherent
psychological beings, well equipped for social life and sensitive to
supportive expressions of adults. Psychologists differ in their interpretation
of the infant's independent initiative in these interactions. Although the
theoretical importance of research on infant-to-infant emotional expression
and communication is obvious, there are few studies investigating how
infants under 10 months communicate with peers and the emotions that are
expressed.
In an attempt to answer questions about young infants' emotional
development and communicative emotional expression, I have studied the
interaction of pairs of infants between 20 and 42 weeks of age. I also
investigated the sensitiveness of paired infants to the motives and feelings of
their partners. I measured turn-taking, imitation, and both local and general
bodily emotional expressions of a reciprocal or complementary form.
A Cross-Sectional study recorded pairs of infants at 20-25 weeks (6
months), 31-35 weeks (8 months), 36-40 weeks (9 months). Nine subjects
from middle class families, 3 girls and 6 boys were videotaped in same age
dyads, seated on their push-chairs, facing each other. There were 3 dyads at
each age, 2 girl+boy, 1 boy+boy. In addition, 2 boys and 2 girls were
recorded at 6, 8 and 9 months), to obtain Longitudinal data. At each age
there was a pair of boys, a pair of girls, and 4 girl+boy pairs. Finally, in a
study of interactions with a self-image, 9 subjects (4 at 6 months, 3 at 8
months, and 2 at 9 months) were videotaped facing their reflection in a
mirror box containing a concealed video camera. Micro-analysis of the first
2 minutes of interaction produced a detailed description of the infant's
behaviours. Four levels of coding were created by grouping microanalytic
categories: to define, first, Behavioural activities; then a Functional level; and
finally, Negotiatory and Emotional acts.
Results show that 6 month-olds try to make contact, but they do
not sustain interaction. As a result, invitations for interactions occur
frequently, but they are not always followed by appropriate responses. The
infants are very interested and very friendly to one another, but as a result of
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their inability to keep attention, they often show indifference. At 8 months,
infants show less indifference. They keep their interactions going for longer
periods, and show much more interest in the other infant, with no irritation.
At 9 months, another change is evident. Interactions and invitations are
more balanced, meaning that the older infants are trying to give the partner
turns in interactive strategies. At all ages, girls were more interactive,
showing more emotional expressions than boys. Imitation is present in all
ages, and at a very significant rate. It seems that infants use imitations to
assist and regulate interaction: to start it, to keep it going, and even to restore
it, when it fails. In the Mirror study, boys were more interactive than girls,
with more positive emotional expressions. This result is opposite to the
differences between boys and girls observed in the Cross-Sectional and
Longitudinal studies, where girls were more responsive. At all ages, infants
are very attentive to their mirror images, which attract them and excite a
richer variety of expressions than they display when faced with another
infant. An important finding is that the 6-month-olds showed clear evidence
of self-recognition in their emotional expressions and interactions.
These findings have important implications, and many are new.
However, they are given cautious interpretation, as this is an exploratory
study, with very few subjects.
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSES OF THIS THESIS
This thesis was planned as a study of interactions between infants, and
of the emotions that pervade these interactions. I expected to shed some light
on intersubjective processes that occur in early development and to examine the
hypothesis that such processes are innate substrates of human beings. For these
purposes, this thesis was organised in six chapters.
The first chapter gives an account of some of the principal psychological
theories of emotion. A theoretical discussion about the concept of
'intersubjectivity' follows, as the Theory of Innate Intersubjectivity is the
foundation of this thesis. Literature reviews on infant-infant interactions,
gender differences and mirror interactions are also presented in this chapter. It
concludes with a summary of the main purposes of this thesis.
The second chapter explains the methods of data collection and analysis.
Infants whose mothers were able to come to the University were recruited and
were paired according to their ages. The infants were recorded in same age
pairs, seated in their push-chairs, facing each other, at 6, 8 and 9 months. The
recordings were made with two professional video-cameras, attached to a
mixer, producing a split-screen image. In addition, the infants were
individually recorded facing a mirror-box. Three studies were elaborated: a
Cross-Sectional study, a Longitudinal study and a Mirror study. The analysis for
all three studies sampled 3 minutes of interaction of each dyad at 6, 8 and 9
months.
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The third chapter explains the different systems used to code the data
which I expected to obtain from the analysis of video tapes. In the first place, I
reviewed coding systems used by other authors, in order to decide the one that
would be appropriate for the data collected. At the end, four coding systems
were devised, each one being derived from the more detailed systems. It was
necessary to start with a microanalytical coding of all the behaviours of possible
interest. Without this, it would not have been possible to understand the
structure and function of the behaviours. The final two functional coding
systems were designed to measure Intersubjective Functions and Emotions,
respectively.
The fourth chapter, the largest one in the thesis, presents the results for
the Cross-Sectional, Longitudinal and Mirror studies, with the statistical
analysis, tables and graphs summarising the principal findings.
The fifth chapter discusses interpretations of the results found. It is in
four parts, as follows: infant-infant interactions; emotional interactions; gender
differences and mirror interactions.
Finally, the sixth chapter draws the main conclusions of the thesis and
discusses possible uses and future directions of research into infants
communicative awareness and the emotional regulations of interactions
between peers in the first year.
1. HISTORICAL VIEWS AND DIFFERENT THEORIES OF EMOTION
Emotions are physiological and psychological reactions, with influence
on perception, learning and performance.
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The concept of emotion in Psychology is confused because there is no
agreement on a definition. Some researchers separate emotion from motivation,
others believe that emotions are only a category of motives; some define
emotion subjectively, based on the feelings people experience, others see
emotion as physiological changes of the body. Most psychologists emphasise
reactions to stimuli as the main component of emotion; others concentrate on
the perception of the situation that causes emotion or on the effects of emotion
on behaviour.
The problem of the relationship between consciously experienced
emotions and physiological changes was relatively simple in philosophical
thought until the 19th century: it was accepted that we consciously feel an
emotion and the physiological changes are a result of that experience.
Wundt (1874), the creator of scientific Psychology, described emotional
phenomena as a separated group of psychological processes that seem very
distinctive. He considered emotion as different patterns of sensations. We
could then say that they are unlimited in number, because Wundt described





Wundt's system received much criticism, because of the large number of
emotions considered by him.
Titchener (1896) did not agree with Wundt and considered only two
kinds of emotions: 'pleasure' and 'unpleasure'. He said that Wundt had
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confused emotion with emotional states. He then defined an emotional state as
a link between a sensation and one of the basic emotions of pleasure and
unpleasure. The two kinds of emotion follow different sensations and create
with them the emotional states, that some persons confuse with the emotions.
William James (1890) was the first to seriously defy the traditional view,
which perceived the physiological changes as the results of emotional
experience. In 1884, James wrote that the conscious experience of an emotion
follows the body's reactions; reactions which are approximately automatic
responses to environmental stimulation. The most important part of
physiological reaction is placed by James in the internal organs; the heart,
stomach, intestines, lungs, blood vessels, and so on. James understood that
learning played an important role on determining which stimuli would elicit the
physiological reactions. However, he insisted that the sensation of fear does not
come from the perception of a stimulus, for example, something dangerous, but
from the physical reactions of held breath, racing heart, staring eyes, that follow
this perception. Carl Lange, the Danish scientist, formulated a similar theory,
almost at the same time, and thus the theory of the primacy of physiological and
bodily reactions is known as the James-Lange theory, the essential novelty of
which may be summarised by the following examples:
Classical view: I see a bear; I'm afraid; my body
prepares to escape.
Tames-Lange theory: I see a bear; my body prepares to
escape; I'm afraid.
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The school of Introspective Psychology, represented by the
psychologists above, made important observations concerning the emotions, for
example:
The adaptation of the emotions to emotional stimuli: long lasting stimuli
causing pleasure or unpleasure tend to be accompanied by a decrease in the
sense of pleasure or unpleasure. There is however, no adaptation to pain.
The concept of emotional diffusion: emotions that follow particular
sensations may be transferred to them, that is, those sensations gain the ability
to arouse the emotions.
Introspective Psychology identifies emotions with the physiological
changes, regarding them as the source of the emotions, as in the James-Lange
theory, but on the psychological level emotions continue to be considered as
consciousness acts, which may be analysed through application of the
introspective method.
Freud (1901), conceiving man as an active being, gives emotions a
prominent role in his Psychoanalytic theory. Emotions are the fundamental
regulators of human actions and they are described as psychological process
with specific functions. Psychoanalytic theory identifies the source of emotions
with instinctive biological impulses, organised as the 'id'. As the individual's
relationship with the physical and social environment develops, emotions relate
to objects, giving each a specific value. In these relations with the environment
the control mechanisms that mould emotional reactions are formed. A late
result of experienced relations with the environment is the creation of new
psychological structures that represent the social aspect in human life, 'super¬
ego'. In some situations, the individual 'ego ' eliminates some emotions from
consciousness. The process of elimination from the consciousness of socially
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undesirable emotions happens as a consequence of fear. As a result, the relation
of some emotional processes with the rest of the personality can be disturbed,
leading to psychological unbalance. The functioning of those structures (id, ego
and super-ego) is believed be the source of a rich variety of acquired emotions
(shame, pride, etc.).
Psychoanalysis, thus conceives emotions as follows:
1) The fundamental source of emotions is in the biological functions of
the human organism. During the bio-psychological development, new
psychological structures are formed and they become a new the source of
emotions.
2) The function of emotions is to be the regulators of human activities.
The present organisation of emotional drives decides on the activity: some
irregularities of emotional processes are sources of psychological unbalance.
3) During the first part of human development, the infant is completely
dependant on the id's emotional drives and instincts, the work of which is based
on the pleasure or unpleasure rule. New regulations in emotions evolve as ego-
based intellectual processes develop (perception, memory, reasoning).
Intellectual processes work as regulators of emotions as the subject begins to
follow the 'reality principle'. And, in the third level of personality development,
the super-ego, there appear processes that eliminate socially undesirable
emotions.
Psychoanalytic theory is the expression of a 19th century view of the
world (the beginning of a scientific materialistic approach to everything).
Consequently, it sees a need to put emotions under the control of the intellect,
because the organic emotions seem to have a negative potential, leading to
mental disorders. Infants without knowledge from experience, are not able to
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cope with their naked emotions. They must acquire a paraphernalia of psychic
processes and defences and intellectual interpretations.
Behaviourism is founded in physiological analysis of psychological
problems. Watson (1931) defined emotions as a specific group of reactions that
appear under three types: fear, rage and happiness. Each one of these can be
described by objective methods of research, that is, through the observation of
the organism's behaviour. Watson specifically identified emotions as vegetative
and glandular reactions, giving them an innate quality. He observed emotions
as special patterns of responses that are initially evoked by unconditioned
stimuli. He noticed that those patterns could be linked to initially neutral
stimuli, through Pavlovian's conditioning technique (for example, the study of
little Albert and the white rat, in Watson & Rayner, 1920). Studying new-born
babies, Watson concluded that there were only three kinds of patterns, called X,
Y, and Z. These earliest patterns are the prototypes of rage, fear and happiness.
According to Watson, all the other emotions are based on those three, as
mixtures or combinations that are constructed through operation of complex
Pavlovian conditioning methods.
Cannon, an English physiologist began, in 1927, an investigation of
these phenomena, and his results are opposed to James-Lange's and Watson's
theories. He discovered that experimental animals and patients who had the
neural connections between viscerae and the brain sectioned still showed rage,
fear, and other emotional reactions. Another experiment consisted in producing
visceral changes associated to emotion independently of the external stimuli by
pharmacological intervention and verifying if the subject still experienced an
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emotion. For instance, injecting adrenaline, increases heart rate and produces
other organic reactions. According to James-Lange theory, the subjects should
experience emotions appropriate to these physiological changes. However, the
subjects did not feel a true emotion; they report only a feeling "as if" they were
afraid of something, or "as if" they were anticipating a happy event. On the
other hand, drugs acting upon the viscerae do affect the subject's reaction to
external stimuli. These studies showed that visceral reactions are important in
determining the individual's tendency to react to an emotional stimulus, but
that they are not enough to generate the whole emotion.
Cannon, then, proposed an alternative theory to explain emotions. It is
called the thalamic theory. and as it was suggested by Bard as well, it is known
as the Canon-Bard theory. According to this theory, the origin of the emotions
is in processes that arise from sensory impulses that come to the thalamus, at the
bottom of the encephalon and dorsal to the hypothalamus. On the way via the
hypothalamus, arriving messages become "emotionally loaded". Normally, the
cortex will inhibit this emotional reaction at the thalamus, but if it does not do
that, emotion is discharged. This discharge consists of a simultaneous
emotional flux from the thalamus to the cortex, upwards (forming the conscious
emotional experience) and, from the thalamus to the body, downwards
(producing the visceral and muscular expressions). We find in this theory the
first clear identification of emotion with neurophysiological processes in the
central nervous system. It approaches the current idea about emotion and the
importance of cerebral mechanisms. However, a very extensive array of brain
structures are now identified as the substrate of emotions, as discussed below.
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Although James-Lange and Cannon-Bard theories recognise the
importance of the interpretation of situations and the feedback of autonomic
system in emotional experience, they do not study how interpretation occurs.
Modern research on this topic was extended in Schachter and Singer's views on
emotion. They agree with James that the feeling of emotions is elicited by the
perception of the feedback of body responses, but they also believe with
Cannon, that this feedback is not sufficiently differentiated to generate many
subtle emotional distinctions. There are, for example, approximately 558
different names to designate emotions in the English language. To reconcile
these two different approaches to awareness of emotion, Schachter has
proposed that emotions are produced either by the feedback of peripheral
responses or by a cognitive evaluation of the situation that caused these
responses (Schachter and Singer, 1962). This way, cognitive interpretation
happens twice: once when we perceive the situation that leads to body
responses and again when we identify the feedback of those responses as a
specific emotion. The following scheme explains Schachter-Singer's the theory:
1. Sensation (stimulus: BEAR)
2. Perception ("It's a bear!")
3. Body responses (Brain to the body: increase of heart rate;
running)
4. Perception of body responses ("My heart is accelerated; I
am running")
5. Emotional experience: interpretation of body responses
("My heart is accelerated because I am afraid of the bear").
As in the James-Lange theory, the first step is the perception of a
situation, followed by body responses. However, while James said that the
brain perceives the responses as a particular emotion only based on the
feedback, Schachter argued that the brain can interpret a specific pattern of
feedback in different ways and give it many labels. According to Schachter and
Singer, the cognitive act of giving a name to a previously undifferentiated
pattern of physiological awareness constitutes the core of emotion. Naming
depends on an attribution, that is the process of identifying the cause of an
event. People can attribute their state of physiological awareness to different
emotions, depending on the available information about the situation. For
instance, if someone is watching the final minutes of a football match, he will
attribute the high heart rate, respiratory rate and sweating to the excitement; but
he can attribute the same physiological reactions to anxiety, if he is waiting for
the beginning of an important exam. Therefore, the emotion felt when seeing a
bear in the forest may be fear, excitement, fright or surprise, depending on how
the perceiver labels his/her reaction.
Tomkins's affect theory (Tomkins, 1962) distinguishes four kinds of
emotional organisation or individual "affect theories":
1. A monopolistic type, in which a single emotion tends to dominate the
affective life of the individual (as, e.g., in the distress or anger-prone individual),
2. An intrusion type. in which a minor element in the general structure
of personality intrudes and displaces a dominant affect under specific
conditions,
3. A competition type, in which one emotion-based structural aspect of
personality perpetually competes with others in the interpretation of
information,
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4. An integration type, in which no single affect theory is permitted to
dominate the personality in a monopolistic way.
The most developmentally favourable outcome (the integration type or
affectively balanced personality) results when affect socialisation is "rewarding"
rather than "punishing". Affect socialisation is rewarding when social agents
permit or encourage the child to maintain positive affective states and help him
or her to reduce or attenuate negative affect states when they occur. The
attenuation of negative affect states is achieved when the caregiver shows a little
of a particular negative emotion towards the child or others, helps the child
attenuate negative affect when it occurs (by de-emphasising, rather than
amplifying the experience), communicates tolerance of the negative affect
within the self and in the child, shows affective engagement with the child or
adult having negative affect (both verbally and nonverbally, nonviable
engagement being especially important), shows consistency among ideological
posture, action, and affect with respect to the emotion, and helps the child cope
with the sources of negative affects so as to avoid their unnecessary
provocation. Tomkins suggests that parents should teach tolerance rather than
avoidance of negative affect experience.
Arnold (1968) has proposed a functional relation between the emotional
experience and the bodily expression. She observes that little emphasis has been
given to the initial perception. In her viewpoint, not all perceptions will result
in an emotional reaction, and thus there is a separate mechanism which
evaluates the situation. So, Arnold defines emotion in a motivational sense.
She suggests the following:
1. Perception: A neutral reception of external stimuli.
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2. Evaluation: An appreciation of the stimuli as good or bad.
3. Emotion: A tendency towards stimuli judged as good and
opposed to those judged as bad.
4. Expression: A pattern of physiological changes organised
towards approach or withdrawal, different in each emotion,
and that accompanies the tendency felt.
5. Action: The approach or withdrawal may occur if another
emotion does not interfere.
The tendency to approach or to withdrawal is a basic component of the
directional aspect of a motive, while the visceral changes are considered
preparation for the body to execute the behaviour.
This admission of the importance of internally generated motive states
for emotion changes the interpretation in an important way away from
preoccupation with stimuli for emotion from outside the subject.
Darwin (1872) was a naturalist before a psychologist. His analysis of
emotional expressions leads to a concern with communication and thus to
interest in the motive sources of emotion. The descriptive ethological account of
emotions situates them in communication between subjects and their motive
states.
Izard (1971) created a Differential Emotions Theory, focusing on a
limited number of discrete, differentiated, fundamental emotions, which have
individual signal properties (i.e., different facial, vocal and gestural attributes)
and provide important communicative links between individuals. Facial and
vocal expressions of emotion are fundamental in the infant's abilitiy to
communicate needs and establish affective relations with the caregiver in early
development. Emotions develop as a consequence of maturation of the nervous
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system, of changing adaptational needs, and of cognitive development. As
emotions are neurophysiological based behaviours, much early affective
behaviour is innate and stereotyped, although socialisation quickly influences
its subsequent development.
MacLean's studies (1952) led him to the consider what he defined as the
limbic system, a phylogenetically very ancient group of cortical structures,
forming with sub-cortical mechanisms an integrated neural system, responsible
for emotional process. Although Brodal's evaluations of MacLean's studies
have questioned what brain areas would be considered "limbic" ones (Brodal,
1982) and have demonstrated that some limbic areas, such as the hippocampus,
have more linkages to supposedly cognitive processes than to those identified as
emotional ones, the limbic system hypothesis is still very influential and
remains a dominant view of how the brain mediates emotion. Current
anatomical studies of the emotional motor system (Holstege et al, 1996) indicate
a very large number of structures in all levels of the brain stem , in the
hypothalamus, basal ganglia and amygdala, and in the limbic cortex.
Recently, LeDoux (1989) has suggested that the amygdala is a focal
point in the affective system. He argues that relationships among amygdala and
cognitive areas (such as the hippocampus and the neocortex) allow interactions
between emotions and cognition, though emotions and cognition are, he
proposes, processed by different neural systems. Another important
observation is that memory plays a fundamental role in the awareness of the
emotional processes. This awareness occur when "event, affect and self-
representations simultaneously coincide in working memory" (p. 284).
However, LeDoux calls our attention to the fact that there are still many gaps to
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be filled in the relationship between psychology and neurobiology of emotion,
but his aim is to show that the two fields are much closer than was thought
before.
This same point is made by the neuropsychologist Damasio (1995), who
shows that brain lesions that change emotions and temperament also transform
cognition.
This review shows how many and how varied are the explanations for
emotion and how, in the final analysis, each one of the theories proves
insufficient, although many seemed to be plausible when they were first
formulated.
As a result, we could say that Psychology will probably never find just
one answer to its question regarding the value of emotion. Maybe because the
subject is human behaviour and its peculiarities, we will never be able to form
more than a partial general theory, subject to change over time. Thus, the first
commandment in the study of Psychology must be: here is not the truth, but a
truth.
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2. INTERSUBTECTIVITY AND THF. DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIONS
Psychology has always been concerned with the study of development,
as a means to help in the creation of new therapeutic procedures, and new
educational strategies, and to understand the original motives behind how
people interact, react to their environment, think and speak, love and hate, live
and die.
For a long time, Psychology accepted, as did the parent discipline
Philosophy in the period of the Enlightenment, that the new-born infant would
have a very limited repertoire of emotional responses. Many scholars believed
that at birth there was only a kind of excitement. Beyond this emotion, there
would be only passivity, which is probably not to be regarded as an emotion.
The infant's excitement was marked by crying, twisting of the body,
disturbance. The quiet and resting state was emotionally neutral. Thus, at first,
the only emotional state would be a relatively unpleasant excitation from
passivity.
In the first three months, according to this classical view, behaviour
would reflect the infant's internal state, being the direct responses to
environmental and internal stimuli direct; only gradually recognised cognitively
with an adequate category or label. This way, typical emotional patterns, as
well as their expressive behaviours are differentiated and developed through
maturation and experience. It follows that emotional exchanges with other
persons could only be possible after this maturation had occurred. The
constructivist epigenetic approach in Psychology, which assumes minimal
psychological organisation at birth, makes it difficult to understand the
apparent delicacy and appropriateness of infants' reactions to how persons
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behave with them, and their ability to recognise an individual who offers care
and love. It leads to difficulties when we consider how positive interactive
exchanges between infants and other persons are maintained and regulated.
In Piaget's (1952, 1954, 1962)) theory of infants' developmental
egocentrism, infants under one year were considered incapable of
communicating with others of the same age. For many years, Piaget's ideas
were prevalent and unchallenged in child developmental research.
Recently, however, these views have been questioned and some
researchers have seen the infant's relationship with others as a manifestation of
what is called intersubjectivity - an innate psychological capacity for recognising
and communicating with psychological states of other individuals. The idea of
human subjects being necessarily in relation and mutually influenced is, in fact,
not new outside psychology. Actually, the concept of human intersubjectivity
has long been the central interest in Philosophy, and in Religion.
For example, such a way of thinking was clearly articulated in
Existentialism. Sartre (1970) considered that one's existence could only be
'justified' by the state of existence of the other. Without him or her, I would not
exist:
Pour obtenir une verite quelconque sur moi, il fault que je passe
par l'autre. L'autre est indispensable a mon existence. Ainsi,
decouvrons-nous tout de suite un monde que nous appellerons
l'intersubjectivite, et c'est dans ce monde que l'homme decide ce
qu'il est et ce que sont les autres.
(Sartre, 1970, p. 67)1
l"In order to grasp some truth about myself, it is imperative that I pass by way
of the other. The other is vital to my existence. Therewith, we quickly discover
a world that we will call intersubjectivity, and it is within this world that man
decides who he is and who others are".
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Buber (1947) considered the individual in relation to the other in a
dialogue. For him, the relationship was "in-between" the one and the other,
between two persons:
There is a genuine dialogue - no matter whether spoken or silent -
where each of the participants really has in mind the other or
others in their present and particular being and turns to them with
the intention of establishing a living mutual relation between
himself and them.
(Buber, 1947, p. 19)
Although this conception of human relations and their fundamental
nature, is also present in the works of Bateson (1973), Bruner (1977, 1990), and
Stern (1985), among others, this view of human inter-relationship has been
stressed most strongly and defined through analysis of mother-infant
interactions by Trevarthen (1974, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993a, 1993b). Primary
intersubjectivity has been defined as the immediate experience of sharing
subjective states (Trevarthen, 1979), and secondary intersubjectivity as the
search for sharing of experiences about events and things (Trevarthen and
Hubley, 1978). According to Trevarthen (1993), intersubjective encounters
become "psychological interactions between selves" (p. 126).
The concept of intersubjectivity is important for the comprehension of
infant's development because it helps us to see the new-born as a whole
motivated being, not only as a chaotic one, with behaviour made up of reflexes.
We are now beginning to understand that infants have a mental life, that they
are particularly well-equipped for social life and eager to become part of it. The
infant is born ready for intersubjective exchanges.
It is known that empathy of emotions is needed for communication
because, emotion is both part of the meaning that the situation has for the
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individual and part of the message for others. Empathy in the relationship
between mother and infant appears to be the foundation for modulation of the
infant's relationships to others that will develop afterwards. The first
relationship, usually with the mother, is remarkable for the intensity with which
it is affectively toned. It surely has a specially emotive quality for the infant,
contributing for the self-regulation of the infant's mind (Schore, 1994).
Timing of expressions is the element that serves as a foundation for
sympathetic engagement between mothers and infants. Beebe (1982) who has
applied the methods of 'conversational analysis' to mother-infant interactions
shows that there is a temporal organisation, a 'coaction' and turn-taking
between mother and infant in their non-verbal communication. A synchrony
develops between expressions of mother and child. And, surely, this synchrony
is one expression of the affective bond between them. We could say that healthy
communication first occurs through affection, that is, through expression of
positive emotion. There is indeed a special rewarding quality, a valence, in the
affection between infant and mother (Fiamenghi, 1997).
According to Trevarthen, emotions are 'intrinsically generated, central,
regulatory states of the brain that unify awareness and co-ordinate activity of a
coherent, mentally active subject' (Trevarthen, 1993, p. 48), and emotions also
communicate between subjects. He believes that at 2 months, infants may
become involved in protoconversations, as a first step towards communicative
exchanges. Protolanguage, with its intricately timed reciprocal behaviours,
"requires that a child has a clear differentiation of an integrated self from the
world of others"(Trevarthen, 1987, p. 182).
This view agrees with Stern's point that "preverbal senses of self start to
form at birth, if not before" (1985, p. 5). He defines 'self as an invariant pattern
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of awareness that arise only on the occasion of the infant's actions or mental
processes. Senses of self are essential to daily social interactions. Examples of
senses of self are sense of agency, sense of physical cohesion, sense of affectivity,
sense of a subjective self that can achieve intersubjectivity with another, and so
on.
According to Trevarthen (1984), infants are coherent beings at birth.
Actually, even inside the womb, the foetus is able to detect, react to, and learn
about the mother's vocal features. In consequence, the infant may show, a few
hours after birth, preference for the mother's voice compared to the voice of any
other woman. An infant may be alert and responsive immediately after birth,
being particularly sensitive to gentle vocalisations and stimuli associated with
holding in the lap, including smell, warmth, rocking and soft tactile stimulation.
New-born infants can be calmed through the use of the mentioned stimuli.
When mothers try to communicate with the new-born, they slowly repeat a
series of brief questions about the infant's impulses and feelings. All this speech
may be considered as an automatic trial to explain or make a comment on an
intense identification or empathy with the infant's motives, especially those that
seem to be directed to the communication with the mother.
Trevarthen (1993) points that there are five principles of emotion to be
tested in infants: coherence in one subject, meaning that emotions set limits and
directions for coherent awareness; autonomic regulation of the body, that is,
emotions coordinate and organise all the body's functions; cognitive regulation
of the conscious self, that is, emotions are involved in cognitive evaluations of
objects and events of the outside world and judgements of experiences;
communicative regulation of self-other relations, meaning that emotions are
communicated between subjects and coordinate their motives; and essential
19
intersubjective valence (sympathetic equivalence), meaning that emotions can
change other person's feelings and motives.
Concerning emotional development, we may say that it is a very special
process because it is through emotion that people express both their changing
inner feelings and their changing relations with the environment. Emotions are
not only products of development, they regulate the processes of development
and learning.
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3. A REVIEW OF LITERATURE IN INFANTS' PEER INTERACTIONS
We are always involved in some kind of emotional process, although we
may at times try to disguise its expression. We may not express the emotion,
but we are surely living it inside our bodies. In fact, movements of our bodies
effectively communicate our inner states. Words, seem comparatively poor
expressions of inner feelings. Before we say anything, people are aware of
gestural and facial expressions that display what we are living inside, in our
inner world. Some psychotherapists, as the bioenergeticists, work with the
body expressions to show the patient the kind of emotion he is living at the
moment and what unexpressed motives can cause in him.
Frijda (1982) says that emotional expression functions to transmit
information about a person's emotional state, and that it is interactive, because
this state will elicit an other's response to that emotion. In this way, emotional
expression is communication. For example, when discussing the ontogeny of
vocal communication, Papousek (1992) says that "communication is viewed as a
sequence of interactional processes where both partners act as communicators
and recipients and where each of them obtains and provides different types of
information, with different vocal means and different function gains " (p. 231).
This kind of direct communication of motive states and processes is
much more genuine in children. They express what they are feeling: happiness,
distress, anger, curiosity. Infants, not able to speak, must express all their
emotions through channels other than the verbal one. Even new-born infants
express differentiated self-defining emotions, as was demonstrated by Wolff
(1987).
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We will not find any expression of interpersonal feelings so authentic as
those of young children. For example, when a stranger tries to communicate
with a 6-month-old baby, the baby will probably cry or withdraw, although the
same baby will be an active player in communicating with his mother
(Trevarthen, 1984).
Imitation, as a direct indicator of sympathy between persons, has
become an important topic in research in infants' development and
communication. It is now proven that imitation exists from birth, and many
researchers are exploring the full range of mother-infant communication,
including the functions of the infant's imitation of the mother or other partners
in communication (Kugiumutzakis, 1993; Maratos, 1973; Meltzoff, 1985;
Meltzoff & Moore, 1989; Nadel & Fontaine, 1989; Nadel & Peze, 1993; Nagy &
Moln&r, 1994; Vinter, 1985; etc.). Other authors are studying the role of playing
and teasing as a means of negotiating affective relationships between mother
and infant (Nakano, 1994, 1995; Reddy, 1991). Nakano considers 'benign
teasing* a way of creating mutual amusement between mother and infant. He
says that affectionate teasing is a very good example of the dynamic processes of
intersubjectivity and the way they contribute to the development of
communication.
Some authors, such as Fogel (1992, 1993; Fogel & Thelen, 1987)
emphasise a new epigenetic of theory of emotional development, the Dynamic
Systems Theory. This theory states that expressive and communicative actions
are organised as complex, co-operative system with other elements of the
infant's physiology, behaviour, and social environment. Although this
statement of general principles is a welcome corrective to over-simple concepts
of innate causes or learning, the theory of Fogel and Thelen (1987) takes a rather
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reductionist position that could minimise the contribution of psychological
functions in early stages. They declare that communicative development in
different parts of the system is asynchronously timed and that individual
actions "often develop within functional systems that are not, at the outset,
related to communication or expression. Coordinative structures that are
precursors to communicative skill can be found early in life in systems serving
respiratory, arousal regulatory, locomotor, and exploratory functions." (Fogel &
Thelen, 1987,p. 754).
I do not agree with this point of view, because I think that many of the
actions of very young infants here classified as serving physiological functions
aim to some kind of communicative effect, and that human beings are involved
in true psychological communication from birth, not adequately characterised as
the mutual regulation of 'coordinative structures'. Actually, it seems to me that
a capacity for sympathetic emotion is primary in the control of patterns of
communication, that it is the coordinative system. This is easily seen in the
examples of early imitation and of mother-infant communication
(Kugiumutzakis, 1993; Maratos, 1973, Nagi & Moln&r, 1997; Trevarthen, 1993;
Vinter, 1985). I hope that my research into infant-infant communication will
produce additional evidence of the motives for communicative exchanges at
early ages.
Some researchers looking beyond mother-infant relationships, have
decided to investigate peer imitation (for example, Hanna & Meltzoff, 1993;
Patrick & Richman, 1985), in the belief that this kind of interaction would
provide answers to questions about the source of coordination. In this kind of
situation, infants are involved in relationships with strangers who are,
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moreover, no more developed, skilled or sophisticated than themselves. The
following studies have brought new insights into the field of human
development and emotion.
Some studies have demonstrated that new-borns have sympathetic
responses: they can be distressed and cry when listening to other babies' crying
(Simner, 1971; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Martin & Clark, 1982).
Fogel (1979) studied 18 infants (7 boys & 11 girls); between 5 and 14
weeks, observing the occurrence and non-occurrence of multiple behavioural
categories: 'gaze', 'facial expression', 'limb movements', and 'body position'.
Each mother held her infant vertically against her chest, supporting the infant
under the buttocks with one arm and around the chest with the other arm. His
results show that the 18 infants, as a group, presented stable differences in
behaviour to mother and to peer. The "Peer" condition evoked more intense
staring with occasional strain forward movements of the head, apparently to get
a closer look at the other infant. Infants behaviour to the strange peer had an
intense, unbroken quality. Eyebrows were typically relaxed with a minimum of
facial movement. Limb and body movement was rare, but when it occurred, it
had an abrupt or jerky tempo. Fogel draws attention to the fact that the "Peer"
condition in this study included the mother as an aware and interested
onlooker, and concludes that the results must be interpreted with caution
because it cannot be sure they show genuine peer-directed behaviour.
Vandell, Wilson & Buchanan (1980) studied 32 firstborn infants (16 male
and 16 female), observed at 6.5, 9.5 and 12.5 months, in 8 girl dyads and 8 boy
dyads, each seen nine times, each 15 min session divided in two parts: toys
present (10 min) and toys absent (5 min). The authors wanted to observe peer
interaction in the first year of life and its sensitivity to toys. They defined
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Socially directed behaviour (SDB) as a discrete act accompanied by a look to the
head of a peer. Their results showed that most common sequence type at all
three ages was a form of "SDB—>SDB". The content of infant-peer social
behaviours indicated the strongly prosocial and vocal nature of the sequences;
interaction frequencies and duration were greater in the absence of toys. Also,
while the infants were more socially active in the absence of toys, this condition
had to be terminated earlier than the toys-present condition because the infants
were more likely to become distressed (although no explanation was offered for
this event). In contrast, many infants could have continued the toy session
longer than they were permitted to do so. The authors conclude that growth in
social skills requires the presence of familiar peers. No sex differences were
found.
Hay; Nash & Pedersen (1981) studied 24 infants, averaging 6.3 months
of age, and equal number of boys and girls (each infant paired with the same
gender), for two 10-min trials. They wished to investigate the reactions of six-
month-old infants to the distress of their peers. Their results showed that the
first infant to become distressed was more likely than not to continue showing
distress from interval to interval; if one infant was distressed in a given interval,
the other infant was less likely than not to be distressed in the next; the infants
occasionally responded to their distressed peers in other ways as well, by
leaning toward, gesturing toward, gesturing toward, touching, or otherwise
contacting the peer. They explain their results with the concept of empathic
arousalj. saying that, for older individuals, it increases systematically with the
magnitude of pain or discomfort shown by others. The main question here is
related to the concept of empathy. It seems to have a negative meaning. Why?
Empathy does not have to have such an evaluation, negative or positive.
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Empathy (or sympathy) is aroused by pain or discomfort but also by partners in
joyous, happy and interested, questioning states.
In another study, Hay, Nash & Pedersen (1983) videotaped 24 infants
(12 girls and 12 boys); 6.5 month-old, to observe infants reactions to touching
either the other infant, or toys in their possession (positive or negative
reactions), and the social influence across time periods of different length. Their
results show that contact episodes occurred more often when toys were absent;
that an infant who initiated one episode of peer contact was not reliably more
likely than the recipient of that episode to initiate the next. They also
demonstrate that the total time spent contacting peers' toys was reliably greater
for boys than for girls.
Jacobson (1981) observed 23 infant dyads (13 male; 10 female), seen
longitudinally over a 4.5 month period. Each dyad met on an average of about
once per week, alternating between the two infant's homes and in the
laboratory, for free-play sessions (scheduled at 10, 12, and 14.5 months). Two
20-min sessions were held at each age: one with a familiar peer and the other
with an unfamiliar infant of the same age and sex. He wanted to observe if
acquainted infants would exhibit more sophisticated social exchanges; if object-
centred contact would facilitate the development of social interaction, and if
certain interactive competencies originate during object-centred contact. His
results show that object centred contact was extensive at all ages. At 10 months
the modal interaction was a two-act sequence, during which the infants often
seemed to be checking each other. By 14.5 months, most of the interactions were
made up of three acts or longer, reflecting growth in the children's ability to
sustain mutual visual attention. The amount of experience with peers had no
apparent effect on the development of social interaction, and prior peer
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experience was unrelated to frequency of both short and long social interactions.
This is important evidence that infants are able to engage in social interactions
without learning to do so. The infants engaged in more manipulative play and
less social interaction when the familiar peer was present; the interest in toys is
apparently diminished by the presence of a novel peer; between 10 and 12
months the frequency of long interactions increased significantly in both object-
centred and non-object-centred situations; long social interactions occur
relatively more frequently in play sessions with the unfamiliar peer; brief
exchanges in the absence of toys are common at 6 and 8 months. Most
importantly, even limited experience with peers is sufficient for the
development of the ability to engage in sustained social interaction.
Adamson & Bakeman (1985) observed 28 infants, seven males and seven
females, in two cohorts (Cohort 1: observed at 6,9,12, and 15 months; Cohort 2:
observed at 9,12,15, and 18 months). All observations were videotaped in the
infants' homes during a 1.5-2-hour-long visit, and the sessions consisted of 10
min. videotape sessions in each of three conditions: alone; with the mother, and
with the peer. The authors defined engagement states ('person engagement';
'object engagement'; 'passive engagement'; 'joint engagement'; 'co-ordinated
joint engagement'; 'unengaged'; 'onlooking') and expressive events were also
coded ('gleeful squeals' [not every vocalisation], 'broad smiles' [not subtle
modulations of facial expressions], and 'excited arm waving' [not limb
movements related primarily to object exploration]). They expected affective
displays to be frequent during periods of person engagement, as they
presumably are during the first half year of life; expected them to be relatively
infrequent when infants are engaged only with objects, are unengaged, or are
just onlooking. Their results show that:
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a) Affective rates were higher with mother than with more observant
peers. With increasing age, the rate of affective expressions and the percent of
affective expressions containing vocal elements increased.
b) Neither sex, nor parity, nor interactions between these factors affected
the scores in any consistent way.
c) The amount of peer contact in the previous month had no systematic
effect.
d) Affective expression was equally likely to occur when infants were
coded in 'person engagement' with either partner, or in 'passive joint
engagement' or 'co-ordinated joint engagement' with the mother.
They conclude that with partners as different as mothers and peers,
infants continue to use affect as greetings and as central themes in interpersonal
exchanges, and that infants as young as 6 months of age engage each other in
purely social exchanges.
As Nadel (1986) shows in her work with imitation between toddlers,
imitation may be a way of starting an interaction. It allows one of the children
to perceive that the communicative partner is interested on her (or him) and
thus, to respond to this invitation to communicate.
All of those findings indicate the importance of studying all forms of
emotional or purposeful expression in infants' development, and not just
expressions that might relate to language (speech and gesture).
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4. A REVIEW OF LITERATURE IN GENDER DEVELOPMENT
Gender research is one of the most controversial fields in
Developmental Psychology nowadays. Basically, there are two positions among
developmental psychologists: those who believe that there are gender
differences between boys and girls, and those who believe that gender
differences is only a cultural issue, a consequence of social conditioning.
The following is a summary review of the main points researched in
gender development to this moment.
The most difficult task for those who believe in gender differences is to
find proof. It is very hard to identify and set aside differences due only to
cultural factors, when those are so widespread in people's lives, from birth.
In gender research, the 'gender stereotype' is a very important concept.
Gender stereotype is a group of socially inculcated beliefs about how a male or a
female must behave. In fact, gender stereotypes do seem to guide parents'
relationships with their children. Actually, even parents who believe that they
are not making any distinctions according to gender, do make them.
Children seem to be more strict in labelling themselves and the others as
male or females (Signorella, Bigler, & Liben, 1993). This starts to happen around
two years, which is fairly early, but a child has already had the opportunity to
be impressed by cultural beliefs by this age.
Chodorow (1978), reinterpreting Freud's theory believes that gender is
biologically defined, and women are more oriented towards relationships. This
is a consequence of women being the ones who conceive, carry and give birth to
the baby. She believes that girls develop a personal identification with the
mother, with a consequent tie between affective processes and role learning,
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whereas boys develop a positive identification with aspects of masculine role
and, as a result, in them the tie between affective processes and role learning is
broken. This appears a very odd assumption, when one considers Murray's
(1992) study with children raised by post-natal depressive mothers. Her results
showed that boys are more affected than girls by mothers' post-natal depression
and deleterious effects can still be seen when the boys are 6 years old. The fact
that emotional disorders in mothers cause emotional and intellectual disorders
in their sons proves that boys are not quickly separated from the mother,
defining themselves as separate individuals, as Chodorow thinks.
In a study of traditional and nontraditional mothers' communication
with their daughters and sons, Weitzman, Birns and Friend (1985) showed that
mothers verbally stimulate their sons more than their daughters, regardless of
their attitudes toward women's rights and roles. Although they think that the
absence of traditional/nontraditional effects could be explained by limits in the
methods of assessment of their subjects, they discuss the fact that attitudes and
behaviour are two different things and when it comes to action, there are forms
of behaviour which are very deeply motivated and rigid.
Weisner and Wilson-Mitchell (1990), when comparing nonconventional
family styles and sex typing in six-year-olds reported significant differences.
They showed that children in sex-egalitarian families displayed less
stereotyping in their activities and interests, when compared to those of
traditional families. However, all children acquired the conventional model of
sex roles and sex typing, regardless of family style. These authors conclude
their study as follows: "if children in the more egalitarian, nonconventional
families carry on their parents' egalitarian beliefs, they will need to do more
than mimic their parents' gender schemas in isolation from their wider cultural
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meaning" (p. 1931). They also reported that, for the parents, even in the most
sex-egalitarian families, there seems to be a limit, that is, there remain activities
that they handled differently for girls and boys.
Maltz and Borker (1983) studying boys and girls groups concluded that
boys interrupt one another more often, use commands, threats, refuse to comply
with another child's demand, tell jokes, call another child names, in their
groups, whereas girls express more agreement with the other speaker, pause to
give the other girl a chance to speak, and acknowledge points made by other
speakers. Miller et al (1986) say that boys use threats and physical force, while
girls use more 'conflict mitigating' strategies to solve conflicts. Leaper (1989)
showed that boys' speech acts are commanding and include negative
reciprocity, whereas girls' speech are more collaborative, with positive
reciprocity. Sheldon (1989) says that girls successfully pursue their ends, but
they do so softening their voice pitch, trying to bring agreement, and
maintaining group functioning. These results support the common sense view
that girls are more oriented to mutually supportive and peaceable relationships
with their peers.
Maccoby's report on gender and relationships (1990) mentions that boys
and girls engage in different kinds of activities, being boys playing in larger
groups, needing more space to play and playing rougher, whereas girls tend to
play in private homes or yards. Also, girls friendships are more intimate and
marked by the sharing of confidences, whereas boys friendships are more
oriented to mutual interest in activities.
Roge and Ionescu (1996) suggest that different behaviours displayed by
males or females are the starting point of an evolutionary system and further
influences will be based on them. They think that it is through an infant's
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behaviours that the infant builds the categories and the system by which he or
she will be referred to.
All of the preceding researchers have studied children, not infants.
Their results are, therefore, open to the interpretation that culture is the only
factor responsible for gender differences. The children are old enough to have
learned.
Nevertheless, although the influence of culture cannot be denied, it
seems that some innate factors are also responsible for these differences.
Otherwise, results like those obtained with nontraditional families should have
shown more consistent similarities between boys and girls. As Golombok and
Fivush (1994) say " gender is not simply something that is imposed on children;
at all points of development, children are actively constructing for themselves
what it means to be male or female" (p. 111).
The best way of trying to show such differences is to study younger
infants, who are not likely to be influenced by cultural factors, and to observe
how differences between boys and girls, such as those described above, will
emerge. This will not disprove the cultural determinants of gender behaviour,
but will attach to it an innate component, that cannot be left behind in future
development.
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5. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE IN MTRROR INTERACTION
Mirror studies have, for the most part, been concerned with the question
of which is the age when children finally recognise themselves. This appears to
be the main concern in all studies using mirrors, and sophisticated and
elaborated arguments are put forward to prove that infants cannot recognise
themselves in the mirror before 18 to 22 months of age. The majority of the
studies defend the use of a surreptitiously placed nose mark as a trustworthy
test of self-recognition.
Amsterdam (1972) says that, from 6 to 12 months, infants think of their
mirror image as a playmate. She believes that, when the child climbs the mirror
or looks behind it, she (or he) is curious about either the nature of the mirror or
the presence of the image. Self-admiration is also not recommended as a
reliable sign of self-recognition, because the child may either be imitating an
adult behaviour or responding to the presence of others. For this author, "the
only established fact is that the child in some way associates his (or her) own
face with the face in the mirror after 18 months" (p. 304).
Zazzo (1993) is a pioneer, who seems to have investigated all aspects of
mirror interaction. He studied infants from 10 months on, and twins, with
mirror and glasses, and concluded that effective mirror self-recognition will
happen at 20 months or "24 months, being prudent" (p. 153), because the infant
touches the rouge mark on his nose. For him, although the child plays with the
mirror image of her (or his) hands, she (or he) does not recognise herself or
himself. This conclusion is based on the nose dot rule. Zazzo thinks that the
child recognises his or her hands, clothes, and so on, before recognising himself
or herself.
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Asendorpf & Baudonnidre (1993) argue that self- and other-awareness
are closely linked because both require a cognitive capacity for secondary
representation. Mirror self-recognition, on the other hand, requires "coordinating
a mirror image (primary representation) with one's objectified self (secondary
representation)" (p. 89). As such, they studied 19-month-old children who had
passed the mirror test (self-recognition indicating by touching the nose dot) who
were observed in pairs, playing with sets of duplicate toys. They concluded that
mirror self-recognition is associated with sustained synchronic imitation as a
form of preverbal communication with an unfamiliar peer.
Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger & Weiss (1989) think that secondary emotions
only appear after the development of specific cognitive skills, like self-other
differentiation, object permanence, and self-referential behaviour. Using the
nose dot as a sign of self-recognition, and observing infants aged from 9 to 24
months, they tried to discover the relation between self-recognition and
embarrassment and wariness. They think that "the ability to consider one's self -
what has been called self-awareness or referential self - is one of the last features
of self to emerge, occurring in the last half of the second year of life. The ability
to consider one's self rather than the ability to differentiate or discriminate self
from the other is the cognitive capacity that allows for all self-conscious
emotions such as embarrassment and empathy" (p. 154).
Contrary to that, Stern (1985) discusses the concept of self, saying that
senses of self exist prior to self-awareness. For him, "the sense of self and its
counterpart, the sense of other, are universal phenomena that profoundly
influence our social experiences" (p. 5). Stern defines four senses of self,
emergent self (from birth to two months), core self (between two and six months),
subjective self (between seven and fifteen months), and verbal self (after fifteen
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months). He argues that the sense of self "serves as the primary subjective
perspective that organises social experience" (p. 11). He thinks that senses of
self are essential to daily social interactions. But, the most important, Stern says
that infants begin to experience a sense of an emergent self from birth, being
predesigned to be aware of self-organising processes and "they never experience
a period of self/other undifferentiation. There is no confusion between self and
the other in the beginning or at any point during infancy" (p. 10).
Analysing some of the current research on self-consciousness, Reddy
(1994) argues that "to look for the earliest origins of self-consciousness one needs
to look not at the infant's attention to the self, but at the infant's attention to the
other. In other word, to look for self-consciousness, one needs to start with
consciousness of other " (p. 3). This point of view agrees with the intersubjective
approach, which is the bedrock for this thesis (as was discussed before).
35
6. PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY
This research was designed as an attempt to test a new methodological
approach to infant-infant interaction. The usual face-to-face paradigm was
used, but with a different setting. Pairs of infants were seated on their push¬
chairs, which were placed with their front wheels touching, in order to
encourage face-to-face interaction without physical contact. Using two video-
cameras, eye gaze could be monitored without the need of sophisticated
equipment, since it was guaranteed that the infants had nothing but the other
infant to look at when facing straight ahead. With this arrangement, it was easy
to register and distinguish gazes to other parts of the room and to the mother.
As a methodological "pilot" study, the principal question that this
research aimed to answer was " Do infants get involved in intersubjective
exchanges with same age peers?". If such interactions did occur, other points
would be clarified, as well:
1. Is this communication emotionally toned? That is, do infants show
the same kind of emotions to peers as they show in interactions with their
mothers?
2. Dependence on 'scaffolding' from the mothers for communication
would be disproved. As the infants were left in front of each other, their
mothers though present, were out of sight and keeping silent, and were not able
to give any hint on how the interactions could be developed.
3. Is the communication similar to or different from mother-infant
interactions, in quality and in amount.
Detailed analysis of a small number of subjects, who could be easily
contacted and monitored was preferred to less detailed measurements of the
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behaviour of a larger population of infant pairs. This reduces the
generalizability of the results. Nevertheless, infants are normally capable of
many interactive exchanges within a short time, once communication is
established, so it was expected that statistically significant results would be
obtained, proving the capacity of infants for supporting organised engagements
with age-mates.
A supplementary mirror reactions study gave additional data on the
expressive capacities of infants and their role in interactions with an infant
image.
An original coding system was developed in four different subsystems,
derived from microanalysis of the behaviours of the infants.
The idea was not to have an a priori code, but to construct a behavioural
account as the videos were analysed. The other functional categories were
constructed out of this first behavioural one, by collapsing terms into broader
categories.
The main point, then, was to test a methodology to show that infants are
really able to communicate with each other from an early age.
In the course of the research, questions arose concerning gender






Letters were sent to volunteers from a list in the Department of
Psychology. From 16 letters sent to families meeting the first criteria (boys and
girls aged from 6 to 9 months), 12 answered positively and appointments were
made to see each one and to explain the research. A copy of the letters sent to
the families is presented in Appendix 1.
All families were middle-class. At the time of the research, six mothers
were working part-time and six were housewives .
Of the twelve subjects, 10 infants were first born, 2 were second born.
Two were born by caesarean section; one by induced labour; three with forceps
and six were normal deliveries.
The infants were divided according to their ages in weeks, to form three
groups:
Age Group 1 (6 months'): ages 20-25 weeks: 4 subjects; 2 boys
(A; D) and 2 girls (E; K).
Age Group 2 (8 months): ages 31-36 weeks: 4 subjects; 3 boys
(T; J; M) and 1 girl (H).
Age Group (9 months'): ages 37-42 weeks: 4 subjects; 3 boys











Ellen E 20-25 F 1st No Normal
Catherine C 20-25 F 2nd No Forceps
Andrew A 20-25 M 1st Yes Caesarean
David D 20-25 M 1st No Forceps
Holly H 31-36 F 1st Yes Normal
Monty M 31-36 M 1st No Normal
Thomas T 31-36 M 1st Yes Forceps
James J 31-36 M 1st Yes Caesarean
Emily E 37-42 F 1st No Normal
Adam A 37-42 M 2nd Yes Induced
Angus An 37-42 M 1st Yes Normal
Stuart S 37-42 M 1st No Normal
Table II.1: Subjects' characteristics. Abbreviations in bold are from girls' names.
In arranging dyads for recording, an attempt was made to pair all
possible combinations within each group. However, there were some
exceptions: in Age Group 2, a boy (M) was not recorded with another boy (J),
because of his mothers' difficulties to find a time for meeting, and in Age Group
3, boys (An and A) were not brought together.
An attempt was also made to record the same age infants on the same
day, as a convenience for the mothers. At the end of the sessions, the following
recordings had been achieved:

























Each family received a copy of their child's video, and travel expenses to
University were paid.
2. Methods
2.1. Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal studies
The recordings were made in the Department of Psychology, at the
University of Edinburgh.
A "recording room" was specially prepared for the recordings. A
diagram is showed below:
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Fig. 1: Diagram of the "recording room"
Two professional video-cameras (Panasonic WF10), a video-recorder
(Panasonic NV180), a mixer (Panasonic WGMX12), which produced a split-
screen image, and a TV monitor (Panasonic TC801), which helped to control the
recordings were used. This position of the equipment is illustrated above.
Heavy wool curtains covered the windows, to keep the light level constant.
The recording procedure is described below:
As soon as two mothers arrived, they were led to the recording room
and the position of the push chairs was fixed. The push-chairs were put facing
each other, with their wheels touching, to make sure that the babies would have
a frontal gaze at one another.
The mothers were instructed to sit nearby (Ai and A2 positions in the
diagram above). They could intervene to help their babies to a more
comfortable position and they could chat quietly to one another. They remained
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present during the recordings to give the infants reassurance. Indeed, the
infants did not seem to be distracted by the mothers' presence, because,
compared to the time each spent gazing to the other infant, the percentage of
time spent gazing in their direction was very small.
After setting the focus of both cameras, fixing the push-chairs' and the
infants' position, the video recorder was turned on and the infants were
observed behind the screen, through the TV monitor (I, in the diagram above).
Recording was continued until either of the infants started to be restless,
grumpy, or crying, when the recording was stopped and another dyad was
brought in. This "free time" recording rule was used because there was a
feeling that infants have a definite time perception and if interactions between
them were to be observed it should be permitted them to take their time. In fact,
some of the recordings lasted fifteen minutes, while others, just one or two
minutes.
While the first dyad was being recorded, the second dyad was in the
"waiting room" where, normally, the mothers were either feeding or changing
the infants. As soon as the first recording finished, one of the infants was taken
to the "waiting room", and another was taken to the "recording room". This
way, there was a rotation of dyads in each age group. All the subjects in each
age group were recorded with each other, with the exception of the cases
described above.
The youngest age group (20-25 weeks ), was followed for 4 months, the
last monthly recordings being made when the infants were 37 weeks old. This
longitudinal study was made to observe age changes within this group. Thus
there are also more recordings in this age group (3 of each dyad).
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With the second age group (31-36 weeks) and with the oldest age group
(37-42 weeks) one recording of each dyad was made.
2.2. Mirror study
Again, the recordings were made in the Department of Psychology,
University of Edinburgh.
A special mirror box was made for the recordings. It consisted in a
sheet of thick glass covered with silver film, to make it like a one-way mirror. A
black cardboard box was made, with two fluorescent lights in each front side
and a small hole in its back, through which a camcorder was inserted. This way,
a total image of the infant was recorded. The final box resembled a big
television monitor. This box was placed on a low table and the researcher was
seated behind it, invisible for the infant.
A Panasonic Camcorder NV S90-B was used, with an external
microphone attached, to obtain better sound quality. The infants were recorded
facing the mirror, either seated in their push-chairs (when not able to crawl), or
seated on the floor (when already crawling). The mother was seated on the
right side of the infant, to give reassurance if needed. Two mothers held their
babies, who, if left unheld, were very unsettled.
Recordings started as soon as the infants were put in front of the mirror
box and last more or less 10 minutes (depending on the infants), until the infant
refused to interact, being fussy or crying. At the end, one subject from Age
Group 3 was not recorded because his mother was unable to bring him to the
University again.
A diagram of the mirror box is shown below:
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3. Analysis and Coding
Videos were first copied with a digital clock added (showing hours,
minutes, seconds, and milliseconds), to facilitate the work of coding the
behaviours. All the videos were viewed and a log of recordings was made,
noting the approximate time of all interactive episodes (defined above).
Interactions were found to occur in 25 sessions, but in order to make the
sample more balanced, one subject was dropped, in each group, making all the
three age groups look exactly the same, with one girl and two boys, for the
Cross-Sectional Study.
Therefore, in the Cross-Sectional study, nine sessions were taken for
further microanalysis, in each age group:
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Age Group 1 (6 months!: 3 (out of 18)2.
Age Group 2 C8 months'): 3 (out of 5).
Age Group 3 (9 months!: 3 (out of 5).
In the Longitudinal study, which involved only the Age Group 1, all 18
sessions were taken for further microanalysis, 6 in each age (when the infants
were 20-, 31-, and 37-weeks-old) and the four subjects were included (two boys
and two girls).
In the Mirror Study, 9 infants were analysed, 4 in Age Group 1,3 in Age
Group 2 and 2 in Age Group 3.
The selected videos were then observed frame by frame, with a
Panasonic VCR (AG-6200) and a Panasonic 21" TV monitor (TX21SIT). The
sample chosen for quantitative micro-analysis in each interaction was a single 2
minute period, from the first moment that the infants gazed at each other3. The
behaviours were coded directly to Claris Works spreadsheets for the Macintosh
with a Power Mac 8200 computer. Then, the data were copied to SPSS, for
statistical processing.
Statistical Analysis:
The statistical procedures used in this research were carefully chosen,
after a long period of study and reflection.
The data analysed is basically nominal, and, as such chi-squares were
the statistical tests chosen, although there was an awareness of the fact that,
being a parametric measure, chi-squares may show some weaknesses, mainly
with small samples, which is the case here.
2 At this Age Group, the first session was taken for each dyad.
3 For an explanation of the coding procedure, please see Chapter III - The
Coding System.
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To take care of that, a loglinear analysis was also performed in each
study. Loglinear analysis searches for a best fitting model that can explain the
differences between the expected frequencies and the ones actually observed in
the data. As a result, chi-squares appear in a much more reliable form and also
likelihood ratios are shown, when needed.
A loglinear analysis was performed, then, for all the three studies, with
chi-square tests and likelihood ratios, when relevant. The approach used was a
general loglinear nonsaturated model, that does not distinguish between
independent and dependent variables, treating all alike and exploring all the
possible associations among them and, being a nonsaturated model it also has




1. Defining a System for Analysis
Before deciding what kind of code would be most appropriate, an
extensive review in the coding systems literature on infants' interactive
behaviour was made.
The first clear difficulty was that most previous studies of infants'
communication were concerned with mother-infant interactions, not infant-
infant interactions. Those few that dealt with infants were in most cases very
narrowly specific in the kinds of behaviours they intended to record.
Mueller and Lucas (1975) defined Socially Directed Behaviour (SDB) as
any discrete act accompanied by a look to the head of a peer. Vandell, Wilson,
and Buchanan (1980), recorded 6-month-old infants, using that definition of
Socially Directed Behaviour (SDB). They accordingly recorded the following
acts: a) vocal: any sound except cry, cough, sneeze; b) agonistic: hit, push; c)
gesture: ex., point; d) cry: includes frets; e) touch: ex., pat; f) smile; g) object related
social act: ex., offer, show, take; h) large body: ex., flap arms, clap; i) approach:
come within 2 feet.
Jacobson (1981), working with 10-, 12-, and 14-month-old infants, used a
SDB (Socially Directed Behaviour) code, following the definition of Mueller and
Lucas (1975). Jacobsons's aim was to observe the role of inanimate objects in
early peer interaction, and he concluded that "early peer contact is primarily
object centred, that is, the infants focus their attention on a common toy, rather
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than on each other" (p.60). This statement may be true of older infants (after 10
months of age) in certain situations, but infants, including younger ones show
direct intersubjective interactions, without objects.
Hay, Nash, and Pedersen (1981) working with 6-month-old infants,
recorded only Distressed Vocalisations, defined as sounds ranging from
whimpers to loud, sustained wailing. Later, the same authors (Hay, Nash, and
Pedersen, 1984), again with 6-month-old infants, observed a limited subset of
behaviours, which they called Interactive episodes: touching the other or
touching a toy in his or her possession. They also recorded the reaction of the
infant as he or she was touched. These authors stated that they were "concerned
about imputing intentionality to the behaviour of persons so young and thus
did not assume that all acts accompanied by gazing at the peer are necessary
'peer-directed'...Rather, we simply asked what infants characteristically do when
their peers impinge directly upon them, by touching either the infants
themselves or toys in their possession" (p.557).
This appears to be an arbitrary restriction of interpretation. There is a
clear difference in 'intentions' when an infant is gazing at another infant and
making efforts to establish any kind of communication, and the case where an
infant is reaching after or taking another infant's toy. The first manifests a
communicative purpose, while the second is either deliberately intrusive, or
disregarding the other subject.
Adamson and Bakeman (1985), defined Engagement States (between 6-
to 18-month-old infants) as person engagement; object engagement; passive
engagement; joint engagement; co-ordinated joint engagement; unengaged and
onlooking; they also coded: gleeful squeals (not every vocalisation), broad smiles
(not subtle modulations of facial expressions), and excited arm waving (not limb
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movements related primarily to object exploration). According to the authors,
their coding system was designed to describe infants' attention, and this coding
segments the infant's attention over time.
Kaye and Fogel (1980), analysing interactions of 6-, 13-, and 26-week-old
babies with their mothers, used behavioural categories, such as Head
Orientation (toward, peripheral, away); Eye Quality (closed, dull, alert), Facial
Expressions (cry, smile, wide, vocalisation, laugh), and Combinations (attention,
greeting).
Subsequently, Fogel and Hannan (1985), studied 9-month-old infants,
using a different set of categories: Face (smile, cry, norm, mouthing),
Vocalisation (vocalising, non-vocalising), Gaze (at and away), Hands (point,
spread, grasp, curl).
Weinberg, and Tronick (1994) use the categories of their IRSS (Infant
Regulatory Scoring System): Social Engagement: the infant looks or glances at
the mother's face; Object Engagement: the infant looks at or manipulates an
object for two seconds or more; Scans: the infant glances at objects or around the
laboratory without focusing on an object for more than two seconds;
Vocalisations: the infant vocalises with 1) neutral/positive, 2) fussy, or 3) crying
vocalisations; Gestures: the infant 1) gestures to be picked up or 2) moves his or
her arms or legs in an organised manner in the direction of the mother (e.g.
reaching); Self-Comforting: the infant self-comforts by 1) sucking on his or her
body, e.g., thumb sucking or 2) sucking on an object, e.g., the chair strap;
Distancing. Escape/Get Away: the infant attempts to distance himself or herself
from the mother by turning, twisting, or arching his or her body in the infant
seat; Autonomic Stress Indicators: the infant exhibits behaviours that indicate
autonomic arousal such as spitting up, hiccupping, or tongueing;
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Inhibition/Freezing: the infant inhibits his or her perceptual, motor, and/or
attentional processes to minimise engagement with the mother and the
surround, e.g., the infant is glassy-eyed. They also use the AFFEX System (Izard
& Dougherty, 1980), which identifies 10 discrete emotions as well as blend of
emotions: interest, joy, surprise, sadness, anger, contempt, fear, shame/shyness/guilt,
distress, disgust.
The IRRS is a very comprehensive coding system, but, as will be
explained, it seemed that certain specific forms of interaction between infants
observed in the recordings of this study were missing in the IRRS.
From this review, it was clear that each of the above authors has chosen
what he or she believes is the best coding system for the chosen theoretical
objectives and the data desired. Hence, after pondering these other systems, it
was decided, as the other authors had done, to create a new coding system, one
which would allow us to account for differences between this work and others,
and which would best fulfil this study's specific needs.
The four category systems are explained in detail below. After each
behaviour, the abbreviation by which the behaviours were identified in the




This coding system which follows aims to identify as many as possible
of the elementary behaviours without making assumptions as to their functions.
As such, it is the first phase of description, and the most detailed.
i) ARMS AND HANDS (A):
•Hands in the mouth (m): The infant moves the hand (or both hands)
and puts it (or them) in the mouth.
•Hands joined (j): The infant moves both hands and puts them together,
each palm touching the other.
•Hold cushion (c): The infant grasps the pillow inside the push-chair.
•Hold ear (e): The infant moves the hand and holds the ear.
•Hold feet and/or legs (f): The infant moves the feet or legs up and
holds them (or holds a foot).
•Hold garments (g): The infant holds a part of the clothes.
•Hold head (h): The infant moves the hands up and holds the head.
•Hold straps/anything (s): The infant holds the straps or any other part
of the push-chair.
•Move down (d): The infant moves the hands down.
•Move left (1): The infant moves the hands to the left.
•Move right (r): The infant moves the hands to the right.
•Move up (u): The infant moves the hands up.
•Open arms (o): The infant opens the arms.
•Pull up clothes (p): The infant holds the clothes and pulls them up.
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•Touch face (t): The infant moves hands up and either touches the face,
or scratches it.
ii) BODY (B):
•Down (d): The infant moves the body as if to 'hide' in the push-chair.
•Escape (e): The infant moves up and forward, pushing, with the help of
the legs and hands, to escape from the push-chair.
•Forward (f): The infant slides the body to the front of the push-chair.
•Incline (i): The infant pushes against the back of the push-chair.
•Left (1): The infant moves the body to the left side of the push-chair.
•Right (r): The infant moves the body to the right side of the push-chair.
•Up: The infant moves the body up.
In the Mirror Study, the following behaviours were coded under BODY
(B):
•Crawl (c); The infant crawls.
•Stand up (s): The infant stands up and touches the mirror.
•Bend (b): The infant bends the body to touch something on the floor.
iii) EXPRESSION (X):
•Close eyes (e): The infant closes the eyes.
•Cough (c): The infant coughs.
•Funny pout (f): The infant makes a pout expression with the mouth,
looking at the other infant and smiling.
•Grimace (g): The infant makes a contorted facial expression,
anticipating a cry,
•Kisses (k): The infant sends kisses to the other infant.
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•Laugh (1): The infant gazes at the other infant and laughs.
•Open eyes (o): The infant opens eyes wide.
•Pout (p): The infant makes a pout expression with the mouth, normally
anticipating a cry.
•Relax (r): The infant stops crying.
•Smile (s): The infant gazes at the other infant and smiles.
•Tongue protruding (t): The infant projects the tongue.
•Weep (w): The infant cries.
•Yawn (y): The infant yawns.
•Zero expression (z): The infant gazes at the other infant's face and
keeps a still-face for more than 2 seconds.
In the Mirror Study, the following behaviour was coded under
EXPRESSION 00:
•Hide (d): The infant hides behind clothes or toys in the pram.
iv) EYES (E):
•Gaze (g): The infant gazes at the other infant's eyes, face or body.
•Look at feet (f): The infant gazes to the own feet.
•Look at mum (m): The infant gazes to the position where the mother is
seated.
•Look at own hands (h): The infant gazes to the own hands.
•Look backwards (b): The infant gazes to the back of the push-chair,
turning the body to the back.
•Look at clothes (c): The infant gazes to own clothes, holding part of
them.
•Look down (d): The infant gazes down.
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•Look left (1): The infant gazes left.
•Look right (r): The infant gazes right.
•Look up (u): The infant gazes up.
v) GESTURE (G):
•Any move (a): The infant moves the hand in any direction (up, down,
right, or left).
•Clap hands (c): The infant claps hands.
•Point (p): The infant points to the other infant's direction.
•Wave (w): The infant makes a waving movement with the hands,
directed to the other infant.
In the Mirror Study, the following behaviours were coded under
GESTURE (G):
•Socks (s): The infant takes the socks off.
•Touch (t): The infant touches the mirror with hands or head.
•Bang (k): The infant bangs the mirror with hands or cup.
•Lamp (b): The infant touches the lamp on the side of the mirror box.
•Lick (1): The infant licks the mirror.
vi) HEAD (H):
•Move down (d): The infant moves the head down.
•Move left (1): The infant moves the head to the left.
•Move right (r): The infant moves the head to the right.
•Move up (u): The infant moves the head up.
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vii) LEGS AND FEET (L):
•Jump (j): The infant jumps up and down, either on the push-chair or on
the floor.
•Kick(k): The infant kicks against the push-chair.
•Move down (d): The infant moves legs and feet down.
•Move left (1): The infant moves legs and feet left.
•Move right (r): The infant moves legs and feet right.
•Move up (u): The infant moves legs and feet up.
•Move up and down (m): The infant moves legs and feet up and then
down, in a continuous movement.
•Open legs (o): The infant open both legs wide.
•Put foot in the mouth (f): The infant moves the foot up and puts it in
the mouth.
•Put together (t): The infant moves both feet and places them with their
soles together.
•Swing (s): The infant moves feet and legs first to the right, and then to
the left (or, vice-versa), and back again, in a rhythmic movement.
viii) MOUTH (M):
•Chew dress (d): The infant puts the clothes in the mouth and chews
them.
•Chew straps (s): The infant puts the push-chair straps in the mouth and
chews them.
•Close mouth (m): The infant closes the mouth.
•Open mouth (o): The infant opens the mouth.
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In the Mirror Study, the following behaviours were recorded under
MQUTH (M):
•Chew (c): The infant makes mouth movements, pretending to chew.
•Pillow (p): The infant chews the pillow.
•Spit (w): The infant spits.
•Tongue (h): The infant touches and holds the tongue.
ix) TOYS (T): This is a special category, which appeared only in very few
situations. Nevertheless, as the presence of toys seems to lead to a
different kind of interaction, we decided to include this category for a
better observation of those interactions where toys play a part.
Investigatory Presentations
Chew (c) Offer (p)






•Attention (a): the first infant starts the interaction with a vocalisation
aimed to call the other infant's attention.
•Change (c): vocalisations started as Self-centred ones, but changed to
vocalisations of Attention.
•Determined (d): a strong appeal to gain the other's attention.
•Fussy (f): vocalisation that shows any kind of distress or tiredness of
the infant, normally ending with cry.
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•Reply (r): any of an infant's answer to the other's request through a
vocalisation, which immediately follows the other's request.
•Self-centred (s): vocalisations the infant produces for himself, not
aimed at the other infant.
In the Mirror Study, the following VOCALISATIONS (V) were
recorded:
•Boo (b): The infant vocalises "boo" to cause surprise.
•Click (c): The infant makes a "click" sound with the tongue.
•Scream (n): The infant screams, but this is a happy, playful sound.
2.2. Intersubjective Functional Code:
The aim of this categorisation, as its name suggests, is to identify
psychological and interpersonal functions; that is, to permit the grouping of
infants' acts in a more dynamic and interactive perspective, identifying their
purpose, rather than making a simple description of behaviours.
However, the functions were defined on the basis of the Behavioural
Categories, by combining them in functional groups, and many of the
definitions are the same.
i) OBSERVANT (OB): Infant 1 either regards directly Infant 2, in a
straight line, eye-to-eye, or looks from the corner of the eye, but into the
other Infant's direction. This function includes the following
Behavioural Codes: gaze (g) and zero expression (z), from the EYES (E)
category.
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ii) WITHDRAWAL (WI): coded whenever the Infant does not
communicate, directing the attention to other things, such as the push¬
chair straps, mother, or closing eyes, and so on. The following
Behavioural Codes can be included here: look at feet (f), look at mum
(m), look backwards (b), look down (d), look clothes (c), look left (1),
look own hands (h), look right (r), look up (u), from EYES (E) category;
close eyes (c), from EXPRESSION (X) category; look (1) from the TOYS
(T) category. Boredom may be a sign of withdrawal; an example of this
category is yawning (y), from the EXPRESSION (X) category.
iii) IRRITATED (IR): coded when an infant attempts to bite, hit or kick
the other one; also, when they cry, or make pouting faces or grimaces.
Behaviours from the Behavioural Codes that fit this category are: weep
(w), grimace (g), pout (p), from the EXPRESSION (X) category.
iv) FRIENDLY (FR): when any of the Infants look at the other, smiling or
laughing, with or without vocalisations. Behaviour Codes that may be
included in this category: cough (c), funny pout (f), kisses (k), laugh (1),
open eyes (o), smile (s), tongue protruding (t), from the EXPRESSION
(X) category; kick (k) from the LEGS AND FEET category (L); point (p),
wave (w), from the GESTURE (G) category; offer (o), tease (t), from the
TOYS (T) category.
v) VOCALISATIONS (VO): This category includes all the behaviours
coded as Vocalisations in the Behavioural Code. All vocalisations
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(attention; change; determined; fussy; reply; self-centred) are coded as
VO here.
vi) BODY EXPRESSIONS (BE): like holding feet, put feet in the mouth,
hands in the mouth, moving body to the left or to the right, moving
hands to the left or to the right. The behaviours that form this category
are all the ones from the ARMS AND HANDS (A); BODY (B); HEAD
(H); MOUTH (M); LEGS AND FEET (L); and chew (c); drop (d); hold
(h); manipulate (m), and shake/bang (s), from the TOYS (T) category, of
the Behavioural Code.
2.3. Negotiatory Code:
After making the Intersubjective Functional Code, it was clear that a
broader grouping was needed, that would facilitate the analysis of motives for
interaction.
As a result, four new categories were created in what was called the
Negotiatory Code, because it shows the infants negotiating their interaction.
i) INTERACTION: both infants are involved in some kind of
interactions, normally beginning with a look at the other's direction
(OB), followed by vocalisations (VO), smiles(FR), laughs (FR), pointing
at (FR), waving (FR), looking at each other (OB), and keeping gaze fixed
on one another (OB).
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ii) INVITATION: one of the two infants tries to make contact but is not
successful, that is, the other infant does not answer. This may or may
not lead to a new interaction. It has the potential to create new
interactions. The infant who seeks invitation looks at the other (OB) and
this behaviour is followed by others, such as the ones explained above
(INTERACTION). But the other infant just gazes back (OB), without any
other reaction.
iii) LOOK: both infants gaze at each other (OB), but no other behaviour
follows. Although all categories start with a gaze, this one is specific,
because nothing more happens (not even a negative situation).
iv) IMITATION: one infant a) reproduces the other's behaviours, b) tries
to reproduce the other's behaviour, but is only partially successful;
c) both infants behave the same way at the same time (attunement -
Stern, 1985).
2.4. Emotional Code:
One objective of this thesis is to understand the process of emotional
interaction between infants, so an Emotional Code was needed.
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As with the preceding coding systems, the Emotional Code was a result








i) CURIOSITY: this category depends entirely on gaze (coded as OB in
the Intersubjective Functional Code). This way, all OB behaviours are
coded as OB: CU+, except those defined as "still face", which are coded
as OB: IN-.
ii) FRIENDLINESS: this category is based in behaviours previously
coded as FR in the Intersubjective Functional Code. VO are coded as
VO: FR+ in the case of Va (Attention), Vr (Reply), Vd (Determined). BE
is a consequence of what happens first (if the previous behaviours are
positive, then BE is coded BE: FR+). FR: IN- is coded when a FR
behaviour follows a WI (Withdrawal) behaviour.
iii) INDIFFERENCE: this category is firstly defined by WI, which means
that the infant stops gazing at the other and looks in another direction.
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Therefore, this can include other behaviours, as a result, such as BE.
Also, VO is coded as VO: IN- in the case of Vs (Self-centred).
iv) IRRITATION: this category is based in behaviours previously coded
as IR in the Intersubjective Functional Code. BE is a consequence, as
much as WI. VO is coded as VO: IR- in the case of Vf (Fussy).
In relation to BE, in the case of positive emotions, when the behaviour
starts as OB: CU+, then the following BE will be coded as BE: FR+. The same
happens for FR: FR+. In the case of negative emotions, when the first behaviour
starts as WI: IN-, then the following BE is coded as BE: IN-; if it starts as WI: IR-
or IR: IR-, then the following BE is coded as BE: IR-.
As a summary when the emotional categories above are combined with
the Intersubjective Functional Code, the observed categories are:
In the positive side:
BE: FR+ FR: FR+ OB: CU+ VO: FR+
In the negative side:
BE: IN- BE: IR- FR: IN- FR: IR- IR: IR-
OB: CU- VO: IN- VO: IR- WI: IN- WI: IR-
In conclusion, the above coding system comprised four parts.
The first Behavioural Code simply notes distinguishable behaviours
descriptively without identifying their functions. This coding system was
suitable for a microanalytical account.
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The second is an Intersubjective Functional Code which attempts to
identify functions for all the behaviours previously categorised, including their
emotional tones, and group them functionally.
The third system, called a Negotiatory Code, was formed by collapsing
the previous code into broader categories to identify interactive or
communicative functions.
The fourth system, the Emotional Code covered the emotions presented
and related them to the Intersubjective Functional code.
Thus the procedure was to identify all behaviours first, and afterwards
recategorize them using the Intersubjective Functional code. Emotions were, then,
coded according to the Emotional code and, at last, the Negotiatory code was
applied.
2.5. The Mirror Study:
When the videos with the mirror recordings were viewed, it was clear
that a new code for both interactive and emotional functions, was needed to
interpret the behaviours shown.
A different interactive code was needed because in the mirror, a
different set of behaviours were displayed, to be described as Interaction (with
own image) and Distraction. Imitation was not coded, because in the mirror
situation behaviours are necessarily the same in subject and mirror image.
A new emotional code was also needed because the infants showed
different emotions from those coded in the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal
studies.
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Thus, the codes for the mirror are:
i) MIRROR INTERACTIVE CODE: this code is basically the same for the
Cross-Sectional Study, and it was divided into:
•Communication: every time the infant looked at the mirror and either
pointed, smiled, vocalised, touched the mirror, looked down at parts of
the body reflected in the mirror.
•Distraction/Avoidance: the infant gave attention elsewhere: looked
back, or to the right or left, or looked to the mum.
ii) MIRROR EMOTIONAL CODE: it was divided into the following
categories:
•Attentive: the infant gazed at the image and maintained gaze for more
than 2 seconds, opening the mouth, or closing it, or made a movement
towards the mirror, still looking.
•Friendly: the infant, gazing at the image, then smiled or laughed,
pointed, waved, kicked, touched the mirror or licked it.
•Happy: the infant smiled or laughed, looking at the image, or to the
mum4.
•Irritated: the infant tried to escape from the push-chair, or started to be
fussy or crying.
•Self-exploratory: the infant looked to the mirror, moving part of the
body, then, stopped the movement and looked to the part of the body
that he or she had moved, moved it again, then looked back to the
4The difference between Happy and Friendly is that in Friendly, besides the
smiling face, the infant showed behaviours towards the mirror.
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mirror, still moving that part of the body. This is clearly not a pure
emotional category, but the infant showed a surprised expression,
which made it appear in part, emotional.
•Shy: the infant looked to the mirror and tried to cover the face with
parts of the body or with toys or pieces of cloth. Another sign was when
the infant smiled faintly and looked down and to the mirror and down
again, lifting the head very slowly and looking back to the mirror.
•Surprised: the infant opened the eyes very wide, raised eyebrows, and
also opened the mouth, while looking at the mirror.
•Unsettled: the infant start to move from one side to the other, or up
and down, frowning or grimacing.
The procedure in the Mirror Study was the same as for the Cross-
Sectional and Longitudinal studies. First, all behaviours were identified, and
afterwards they were recategorized using the Mirror Interactive Code. Then,




Data from the three studies, Cross-Sectional, Longitudinal, and Mirror
were analysed as follows.
In the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal studies, behaviours were
categorised according to:
1. A Negotiatorv Code; in which group differences were assessed in the
following functions of behaviour:
a) Interaction; b) Invitation; c) Imitation.
2. An Emotional Code, comprising the following categories:
a) Positive Emotions: Curiosity and Friendliness;
b) Negative Emotions: Indifference and Irritation.
In the Mirror study, modified codes were used in recognition of the
artificial intersubjective situation:
1. An Interactive Code. with the following categories:
a) Communicative; b) Distracted/Avoidant.
2. An Emotional Code, identifying the following categories:
a) Attentive; b) Friendly; c) Happy; d) Irritated;
e) Self-exploratory; f) Shy; g) Surprised; h) Unsettled.
Because the number of subjects in the Mirror Study is different in each
Age Group, these groups were analysed separately.
Gender related effects were examined in all 3 studies.
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1. CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDY
1.1. NEGOTIATION: INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOURS
Data are reported for 3 different triads of infants, at different ages, each
triad comprising one girl interacting separately with two boys.
As has been explained in Chapter II, first a detailed description of each
infant's behaviours was made, then behaviours were grouped in categories, and
finally, the latter were collapsed into 4 broad behaviour types, Interacting,
Inviting, Looking, and Imitating. Looking was excluded from analysis, as the
other types of behaviour required mutual gaze to be maintained. This code of
behavioural types, intended to give information on the presence and type of any
intersubjective responses, was called 'Negotiatory'.
In the following tables, numbers represent the incidence of the named
behaviours in a sample of 3 minutes. Numbers in italics represent percentages
of behaviours.
1.1.1. Negotiation by Age Groups
The following table (Table IV.l) shows the frequency of behaviours in

























































































Chart IV.l shows a clear picture of the three different ages. A general
increase in communication is shown, with an apparent drop in the frequency of




6 months 8 months 9 months
Chart IV.l: Cross-Sectional Study; Negotiatory Code; Differences by Age.
At 6 months, the highest percentage of behaviours is in the Invitation
category (54.2%), which indicates that the infants were trying to interact with
each other, and that they were not always successful. Invitation included
attempts at eliciting a reaction, and they could fail.
At 8 months, Interactions and Imitations are approximately equal, and
Invitations have dropped by half. This may indicate an eagerness to interact
continuously, with little time left for pauses that might prompt invitations.
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At 9 months, there is more communicative ability and all the three
categories are equally frequent, which indicates that infants are vigorously
involved in interactions, using imitations and inviting each other for new
interactions.
A chi-square test and a likelihood ratio show highly significant
differences across the three ages, for all three categories, suggesting that the
above data indicate a real evolution of interactive patterns.
Value DF Significance
Pearson %2 49.091 16 .00003
Likelihood Ratio 53.185 16 .00001
1.1.2. Negotiation by Gender5:
At each age, the behaviours of the 2 boys indicate a lower level of
motivation for communication, than the girl. At 9 months, boys are slightly
dominant over girls.
However, chi-square tests showed that those differences could not be
taken as significant. And, as the number of boys and girls is different, the
results are not fair for the girls. The only possibility would be to test each girl
against each boy (in each age group). The result showed no significant
difference between boys and girls, except in one case (Emily X Stuart, 9 months;
yj-= 13.53, df= 2, p< 0.001). In this case, that result favours the girl.
Chart IV.1.1 shows the behaviours of all 9 subjects:








Chart IV. 1.1: Cross-Sectional Study; Negotiatory Code; Differences by
Gender, showing all subjects.
1.1.3. Negotiation by Infant Dyad:
At each age there were three dyads; two girl-boy and one boy-boy.
Table IV.2 shows the frequency of behaviours in each pair.
The most notable result is that at 6 and 8 months, no interactions were
found when boys were paired. Only in the third age group did the two boys
show interactive patterns when faced with each other, but, still in lower










Imitation 6 13 0 19
27
Interaction 8 6 0 14
19


















Imitation 28 6 0 34
38
Interaction 34 6 0 40
44


















Imitation 21 32 9 62
32
Interaction 22 40 14 76
39










Table IV.2: Cross-Sectional Study; Negotiatory Code; Infant Dyads.
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This seems to support the hypothesis of a gender difference in the
interactions between pairs of infants. Girl-boy pairs show much more
interactions at all ages (despite the differences being non-significant at 8
months). Girls were not recorded interacting with girls in this study.
A loglinear analysis was conducted to search for the best model that
could fit these data on interactions. The results showed that a model of
interaction Gender+Age+Negotiatory code was the most appropriate. Statistical
tests for this model show how significant it is:
Goodness-of-fit Statistics Value DF Sig.
Pearson %2 32.168 12 .0013
Likelihood Ratio 30.891 12 .0020
These results mean that there is a significant interaction between
gender, age and the interactive functions that are represented by the
Negotiatory Code, that is, interactions change, both with the age of the infant
and depending on his or her gender.
I conclude that, as infants develop, their interactive patterns change
from an 'invitational' style, comprising attempts to interact, some successful,
others not, to a more directed approach, with the help of imitations aimed to
initiate interaction and to renew it, if it falters. Invitations in the older ages are
almost always followed by an interaction. As far as gender is concerned, the
results seem to indicate differences between boys and girls, although stronger
evidence is needed.


























Chart IV.2: Cross-Sectional Study; Negotiatory Code; Gender Differences
considering pairs of subjects, in the three age groups.
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1.2. EMOTION: INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOURS
Emotional behaviours showed by the subjects were coded in two
categories: Negative and Positive. Positive emotions include Curiosity and
Friendliness. Negative emotions are coded as Indifference and Irritation.
1.2.1. Emotions by Age Groups:
Table IV.3 appears to show that emotional behaviours change with age.
With the 9 infants seen, at 6 months, Curiosity (45%) prevails over
Friendliness (26%) and Indifference (25%). Apparently, younger infants are
curious about other infants, can react in a friendly way to them, but equally can
be disinterested, or may shift their attention to other things in the environment.
At 8 months, the infants recorded here, were curious (50%), but they
were also more friendlier (35%) than indifferent (15%). They appeared more
able to keep their attention to the other infant for longer periods.
The infants, at 9 months, show Curiosity (39%) and Friendliness (35%)
in equal measures. Evidently, those infants were more able to change from the
initial interest aroused by confronting another being like themselves, and to
show positive emotions toward the other infant. The Indifference score (25%)
shows that they are able to ignore the other infant from time to time. It seems


































































































It is noticeable that there was very little Irritation, at all three ages. I
considered dropping this category for statistical analysis (the presence of many
zeros is not good for loglinear tests), but, as it is an interesting result, I decided
to keep it in.
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Chart IV.3: Cross-Sectional Study; Emotional Code; Differences by Age.
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1.2.2. Emotions by Gender 6:























Chart IV.3.1: Cross-Sectional Study; Emotional Code; All Subjects.
6 Please, see Table IV.3 for data of all subjects.
78
1.2.3. Emotions by Infant Dyad:
Table IV.4 shows the frequency of behaviours in each pair.
The most important thing to be observed in this table is that there are no









































































Chart IV.4: Cross-Sectional Study; Emotional Code; Gender Differences



























































































































A loglinear analysis was conducted to search for the best model that
could fit these emotional situations. The best fitting model seems to be the one
that considers the interaction among Gender+Age+Emotional situations
(expressed by the Emotional Code). In fact, the statistical tests show a very high
degree of significance for that model:
Goodness-of-fit Statistics Value DF Sig.
Pearson %2
60.837 17 .0000008
Likelihood Ratio 65.312 17 .0000001
According to this model, an infant's emotion is related to both gender
and age. Girls seem to express their emotions more than boys, who tend not to
interact emotionally with other boys, at least in younger ages (6 and 8 months).
It seems that at first, Curiosity leads the expressions when interacting with
others, with Indifference and Friendliness showing the same rate of occurrence.
But, as infants become older, friendly expressions appear to take precedence
over other expressions, and, by 9 months, a more balanced pattern of emotional
expressions is achieved, concerning the interaction with other infants. Active
negative emotions, such as Irritation appear in a very low number, meaning that
probably the first emotional interactions with others are very positive toned.
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2. LONGITUDINAL STUDY
2.1. NEGOTIATION: INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOURS
As mentioned in Chapter IV - Methods, four subjects were included in
the Longitudinal study, two girls and two boys (one girl and two boys were also
part of the Cross-Sectional study, age group 1), recorded when they 20, 31 and
37 weeks-old.
2.1.1. Negotiation by Age Groups
Table IV.5 shows the results for all ages.
As in the Cross-Sectional study, at 6 months, the majority of behaviours
fall into the Invitation category (52%). Interaction (20%) and Imitation (28%) are
more or less balanced. As discussed before, this means that infants were trying
to make contact with each other, but were not being successful in most of the
situations.
At 8 and 9 months, there is a very balanced number of behaviours in the
three categories, mainly at 8 months, when the proportions were more or less
the same, with Interaction and Invitation with the same amount (33%) and
Imitation with 34% of all behaviours. At 9 months, Invitation drops a little
(29%) when compared with Interaction (32%), and Imitation (39%), but
technically the frequencies are almost the same.
This is a different result from the Cross-Sectional study, because here
there is no difference between 8 and 9 months. Such a result could (wrongly)
lead us to conclude that from 8 to 9 months infants do not show any difference
in interactive patterns. But it cannot be forgotten that, in the Cross-Sectional
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Ellen Katie Andrew David Totals
6 Months
Imitation 11 1 3 7 22
28
Interaction 8 1 4 3 16
20
Invitation 25 0 9 7 41
52
Totals 44 2 16 17 79
56 2 20 21 100
8 Months
Imitation 11 26 0 9 46
34
Interaction 11 22 0 11 44
33
Invitation 17 22 0 5 44
33
Totals 39 70 0 25 134
29 52 0 19 100
9 Months
Imitation 21 13 5 0 39
39
Interaction 16 8 8 0 32
32
Invitation 15 12 2 0 29
29
Totals 52 33 15 0 100
52 33 15 0 100
Table IV.5: Longitudinal Study; Negotiatory Code; All Subjects.
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study, they were familiar to each other after the first recordings. This familiarity
could explain the same pattern of interactions at 8 and 9 months for this group.










6 months 8 months 9 months
Chart IV.5: Longitudinal Study; Negotiatory Code; Differences by Age.
The results show that at 6 months, infants are able to get involved in
interactions, although they are easily distracted by external factors.
Consequently, they use more Invitations than older infants, in order to try to call
the other infant's attention and to start a new interaction.
It is important to note that, as in the Cross-Sectional study, Imitations
appear here in a significant number, in all three ages. Imitations are powerful
means of interaction for infants, because they can use them to start a new
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interaction, to keep the interaction going and to re-start it, once the other infant
is distracted.7
2.1.2. Negotiation by Gender:
As table IV.6 shows, differences between boys and girls at 8 and 9
months are large. At 6 months the difference is less, although girls are still in
advantage.
6 Months 8 Months 9 Months
girls boys Total girls boys Total girls boys Total
Imitation 12 10 22 37 9 46 34 5 39
28 34 39
Interaction 9 7 16 33 11 44 24 8 32
20 33 32
Invitation 25 16 4 39 5 44 27 2 29
52 33 29
Total 46 33 79 109 25 134 85 15 100
58 42 100 81 19 100 85 15 100
Table IV.6: Longitudinal Study; Negotiatory Code; Gender Differences
These results are quite different from those of the Cross-Sectional study.
The explanation is very simple: here, the number of boys and girls is the same,
so the results show an actual picture of what is happening between boys and
girls in interactive patterns.
Therefore, at 6 months, girls already show a difference in interactive
patterns, when compared to boys at the same age. They not only interact and
7 This point will be developed on Chapter V - DISCUSSION
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imitate more than the boys, but seem also to take more initiative in interactive
situations, since they also invite more. Maybe this pattern changes in older
children, but according to our data, girls are responsible for the majority of the
interactive situations. This confirms the results for the Cross-Sectional study.






















Chart IV.6: Longitudinal Study; Negotiatory Code; Differences by Gender.
86
2.1.3. Negotiation by Infants' Dyads:
Table IV.7 shows the results for pairs of infants, at all ages.
In all three age groups, there are no interactive exchanges between boys.
This result is in accordance with the Cross-Sectional study, where only at 9
months, interactive exchanges between boys and boys were found.
The two girls interacted at all ages, and girls interacted with boys in 33%
of the sessions.
At 6 months, interactive exchanges between boys and girls were the
most numerous (more than 90% of the total behaviours). At 8 and 9 months
only one of the four boy-girl pair interacted, and they did so slightly less than
the two girls at these ages.




Chart IV.7: Longitudinal Study; Negotiatory Code; Gender Differences
considering pairs of subjects, in the three age groups.
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These results confirm that a difference of gender seems to exist in this
sample, as far as interactive exchanges is concerned.
A loglinear analysis was conducted to find the best model that could fit
these interactive exchanges. The results showed that a model of interaction
between Gender + Age + Negotiatory Code was the best to be considered.
Statistical tests for this model showed its high significance:
Goodness-of-fit Statistics Value DF Sig.
Pearson %2
37.237 12 .0002
Likelihood Ratio 37.991 12 .0002
These results mean that there is a significant interaction between
gender, age and the communication situations (represented by the Negotiatory
Code), that is, communicative interactions change, depending on the age of the
infant and on his or her gender. Also, the results for Negotiatory Code in the
Longitudinal study confirm and support the results obtained in the Cross-
Sectional study for Negotiatory Code.
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Ellen + Ellen + Ellen + Katie + Katie + Andrew Totals
Katie Andrew David Andrew David + David
6 Months
Imitation 3 6 13 0 0 0 22
28
Interaction 2 8 6 0 0 0 16
20
Invitation 2 28 11 0 0 0 41
52
Totals 7 42 30 0 0 0 79
9 53 38 100
8 Months
Imitation 23 0 0 0 23 0 46
34
Interaction 22 0 0 0 22 0 44
33
Invitation 32 0 0 0 12 0 44
33
Totals 77 0 0 0 57 0 134
58 0 0 0 42 0 100
9 Months
Imitation 25 14 0 0 0 0 39
39
Interaction 16 16 0 0 0 0 32
32
Invitation 17 12 0 0 0 0 29
29
Totals 58 42 0 0 0 0 100
58 42 0 0 0 0 100
Table IV.7: Longitudinal Study; Negotiatory Code; Infants' Dyads.
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2.2. EMOTIONS: INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOURS
Emotions were coded as Positive (Curiosity and Friendliness) and
Negative (Indifference and Irritation), in the same way as in the Cross-Sectional
study.
2.2.1. Emotions by Age Groups:
Table IV.8 shows many differences in emotional expressions according
to different ages.
As in the Cross-Sectional study, Curiosity is the most prominent of the
emotional expressions at 6 and 8 months (38% and 49%, respectively). At 8
months, the infants are predominantly curious and friendly. Between 8 and 9
months there is an increase in the proportion of Indifferent behaviour, which
can be explained by the facility that the older infants have gained in shifting
their attentions to other things and persons in their environment. This was not
found in the Cross-Sectional study. The explanation resides in the fact that in
this study, the infants were becoming used to each other and losing interest.
Nevertheless, at the whole, the results show that infants tend to be curious
about unfamiliar infants, and they react with friendly expressions to them. At 6
months, infants quickly get bored or disinterested, and react indifferently to the
other infant. At 8 months, infants are less expressive, but ready to keep a
friendly expression. However, at 9 months, if the other infant is already known,
the infant will lose the interest and react with indifference. If the other is
unfamiliar, then the emotional expressions will be more friendly and curious.
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Ellen Katie Andrew David Totals
6 Months
Curiosity 75 29 43 11 158
39
Friendliness 67 30 12 10 119
29
Indifference 61 35 13 12 121
29
Irritation 0 0 4 8 12
3
Totals 211 94 72 33 410
51 23 18 8 100
8 Months
Curiosity 5 23 0 19 47
49
Friendliness 3 19 0 15 37
38
Indifference 0 4 0 5 9
9
Irritation 0 3 0 1 4
4
Totals 8 49 0 40 97
8 51 0 41 100
9 Months
Curiosity 5 23 16 0 84
32
Friendliness 28 23 10 0 61
23
Indifference 45 21 30 0 96
37
Irritation 14 5 2 0 21
8
Totals 132 72 58 0 262
50 28 22 0 100
Table IV.8: Longitudinal Study; Emotional Code; All Subjects.
Confirming the results of the Cross-Sectional study, infants showed very
little expressions of Irritation. In fact, it seems that infants up to 9 months prefer
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to use Indifference rather than Irritation to display a negative reaction to
another infant.








6 months 8 months 9 months
Chart IV.8: Longitudinal Study; Emotional Code; Differences by Age.
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2.2.2. Emotions by Gender:
Table IV.9 shows a great difference in emotional expression between
boys and girls, at all ages. Except in the case of 8 months, where the results are
more equal, girls are almost four times more expressive than boys in their
emotions.
6 Months 8 Months 9 Months
girls boys Total girls boys Total girls boys Total
Curiosity 104 54 158 28 19 47 68 16 84
39 49 32
Friendliness 97 22 119 22 15 37 51 10 61
29 38 23
Indifference 96 25 121 4 5 9 66 30 96
29 9 37
Irritation 0 12 12 3 1 4 19 2 21
3 4 8
Total 305 105 410 57 40 97 204 58 262
74 26 100 59 41 100 78 22 100
Table IV.9: Longitudinal Study; Emotional Code; Gender Differences.
















Chart TV.9: Longitudinal Study; Emotional Code; Differences by Gender.
2.2.3. Emotions by Infants' Dyads:
Table IV. 10 shows the results for all the dyads, at all ages.
Boys seem to have more difficulties to express emotionally when
confronted with boys, since no expression was recorded in those boys+boys
dyads. This way, tables above confirm the results for gender, since no
emotional expression was registered for boys interacting with boys.
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These results also confirm the Cross-Sectional study for Emotional
Code, showing a difference between girls and boys in emotional expression.
Chart IV.10 presents the results for infants' pairs.
A loglinear analysis was performed, to look for the best model that
could fit these expressive situations. The results showed that a model of
interaction among Gender+Age+Emotional code was the best to be considered.
Statistical tests for this model show how significant it is:
Goodness-of-fit Statistics Value DF Sig.
Pearson %2
72.691 17 .000000007
Likelihood Ratio 74.895 17 .000000003
This model means that there is an interaction among age, gender and
emotional expressions (represented by the Emotional Code).
As infants grow, it seems that they tend to show more friendliness,
curiosity, but more indifference, as well. In fact, this is an interesting result,
which was not found in the Cross-Sectional study, where the infants were
unfamiliar to each other. As mentioned before, this is an effect of habituation to
another infant whom they have met before.
Again, here there is a very small amount of irritated expressions. This
confirm the Cross-Sectional study, in the sense that infants probably use more

















Curiosity 57 78 23 0 0 0 158
39
Friendliness 62 36 21 0 0 0 119
29
Indifference 65 34 22 0 0 0 121
29

















Curiosity 10 0 0 0 37 0 47
48
Friendliness 4 0 0 0 33 0 37
38
Indifference 0 0 0 0 9 0 9
9

















Curiosity 42 42 0 0 0 0 84
32
Friendliness 35 26 0 0 0 0 61
23
Indifference 48 48 0 0 0 0 96
37
















Table IV. 10: Longitudinal Study; Emotional Code; Infants' Dyads.
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3. MIRROR STUDY
3.1. INTERACTIVE CODF.
As explained in the Methods chapter, the same infants who participated
in the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal studies were also invited to face their
reflections in a mirror box.
The data were analysed according with age and gender.
3.1.1. Interactions by Age:
Table IV.ll shows the results for different ages8.
Although the number of subjects is different in each age, it is interesting
to note that the vast majority of behaviours in the three ages is communicative.
That means that, even at 6 months, these infants were very interested in their
own mirror image and, they spent a high proportion of the time interacting with
it.
8 The number of subjects is different in each age for two reasons:
a) All subjects involved both in the Cross-Sectional and the Longitudinal study
were analysed. There were, therefore, more subjects at 6 months, than at 8 and
9 months.
b) In the 9 month group, one of the infants could not be recorded. There are,






































































Chart IV.11 shows these results:
Chart IV. 11: Mirror Study; Interactive Code; Differences between
Communication and Distraction in each Age.
Because of the difference in the number of subjects in each age , it is not
possible to calculate a chi-square combining the three ages. But it is possible to
observe the differences between interaction and distraction in each age, which
are highly significant at all three ages:
Value DF Significance
6 months 61.46 1 0.0001
8 months 72.00 1 0.0001
9 months 37.69 1 0.0001
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3.1.2. Interaction by Gender 9:
The most interesting result is the difference between boys and girls.
At 6 months, it seems that these boys and girls are very similar in the
number of interactive expressions with the mirror images. If distractions are not
considered, boys show 52% of the total and girls show 47% of the total
interactions.
But at 8 and 9 months, the difference is much greater, with boys
showing almost twice as many interactions as girls (boys, 76%; girls, 24%, at 8
months10; boys, 62%; girls, 38%, at 9 months).
Chart IV. 11 shows these results, as well, observing the differences
between boys and girls. Apparently as far as mirror images are concerned, boys
are more interactive than girls.
A loglinear analysis was performed and the model fitting the data is one
that shows an interaction among age, gender, and interactions (represented by
the Interactive Code). Statistics show a very high significance for this model:
Goodness-of-fit Statistics Value DF Sig.
Pearson %2
52.617 7 .000000004
Likelihood Ratio 56.880 7 .0000000006
9 Please, see Table IV.11 for the results for each subject.. Because the number of
boys and girls is different in each group, it is impossible to make a table
summing up boys X girls.
10 It is important to remember that there are more boys than girls at 8 months.
However, if each boy is compared separately to the girl, they will still show
more interactions than hers:
-Holly+Monty: Holly, 40%; Monty, 60%
-Holly+Thomas: Holly, 45.9%; Thomas, 54.1%
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This model fits the results, showing that infants' interaction with their
mirror image happen even at 6 months of age, and this interaction is probably




The data were analysed according to age and gender in the Emotional
Code of the Mirror study. As explained before, the Emotional Expressions for
the Mirror study are not the same for the Emotional Code of the Cross-Sectional
and Longitudinal studies.
3.2.1. Emotional Code by Age:
Table IV.12 shows the results of this analysis.
The first thing to be noted is that, in the Mirror study, the infants
showed a larger variety of emotional expressions than in the Cross-Sectional
and Longitudinal studies. Attentive expression was predominant in all ages
groups. Apart from that, there are some differences among ages:
At 6 months, infants face the mirror basically with an Attentive
expression (51% of the total). Other expressions are less frequent, but there is a
significant presence of Friendly (16%) and Happy (13%) expressions. The
negative emotional expressions, Irritated (4%) and Unsettled (8%) are very few,
and were not obviously connected with the mirror situation, but with boredom
and fatigue. A very interesting expression with two subjects at 6 months was
Self-exploration (3%), which is not classified as an emotional reaction. These
infants looked at the image of their hands moving, looked back at their hands,


























































































































































































At 8 months, although Attentive expressions were dominant (43%),
Friendly expressions appeared with more intensity (26%), and a Happy
expression was approximately the same as at 6 months (17%). Negative
expressions dropped (Irritated, 1%; Unsettled, 5%). Self-exploration appeared
again (3%).
At 9 months, Attentive expressions are still dominant (42%), but the
positive expressions Friendly (19%) and Happy (33%) are also high. No
negative expression was recorded at this age.
Chart IV.12 shows the results above.
A chi-square test and likelihood ratio show a very strong significance for




Likelihood Ratio 204.858 64 .000001
These results mean that, as age progresses, infants show more
positive emotional expressions, and eliminate negative ones when they are
contacting with their own mirror image. Although the frequency of Self-
exploratory expressions was not very high, the simple fact that they had
occurred at 6 months opens an interesting field for discussion.
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3.2.2. Emotions by Gender
Table IV.12 shows the results for each infant.
The results show a difference when compared with the Interactive Code.
At 6 months, girls are more expressive than boys, as far as emotional
expressions, positive and negative, are concerned (girls, 77%; boys, 59%). At 8
and 9 months, however, boys are more expressive than girls (8 months: girls,
23%; boys, 77%; 9 months: girls: 32%; boys: 68%). Girls seem to go through all
the different patterns of emotion, whereas boys tend to stay in the positive side.
If only positive emotions are considered, then boys are superior in all ages.
Interestingly, boys never showed shyness in this study, when
confronted with their mirror images. Although this category was rare (girls
showed 1% of the total behaviours), this is an interesting result.
As it may been seen, the difference between boys and girls at 6 months
is small. At 8 months, in one comparison (Holly+Monty), there is a significant
difference, whereas in the other (Holly+Thomas), the difference is non¬
significant. This may be more a reflection of individual differences. At 9
months, the difference is significant. The statistical results for each age are very
unclear, and this can be ascribed to the small number of subjects. If the three
ages are considered together, then the statistical results become significant.
Chart IV.12 also shows the results for the Emotional Code of the Mirror
Study.
A loglinear analysis showed that the best fitting model for this study
had to consider the interaction among age, gender and emotional expressions.
11 Please, see footnote 8.
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Statistics show the significance for that model:
Goodness-of-fit Statistics Value DF Sig.
Pearson %2
168.033 42 .00001
Likelihood Ratio 186.474 42 .00001
This means that there is a difference in gender across ages in emotional
expression.
Summary of Results:
In short, the results for this research show the following general picture
of what happens across ages in infant-infant interaction:
It seems that, at 6 months, infants do try to make contact, but, they lack
the ability of keeping this contact going. As a result, invitations for interaction
occur frequently, and they are not always followed by interactions. The infants
react to one another with curiosity and they are friendly to the other infant, but
as a result of an inability to keep their attention fixed for a long time on any one
object, they score high on 'indifference'. This indifference does not imply
disinterest, but rather a shift of attention to other objects. Indifference is
characterised by a quick shift of attention away from the other infant to an
object and then a shift to the other infant again. It is a negative communicative
signal.
At 6 months, girls are apparently more interactive and more expressive
than boys.
At 8 months, a change occurs towards more interaction and less
indifference. Infants at this age seem to be able to keep their interactions going
for longer periods, and they show much more interest in the other infant, with
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no irritation at all. In fact, the interest shown is so intense that invitations occur
with less frequency, and the interactions continue uninterrupted for several
minutes. In one sense, this is not optimal communication, because turn-taking
is necessary, but it does show that infants at this age have an ability to maintain
a conversation. Girls are again superior to boys, both in interactive patterns and
positive emotional expressions.
At 9 months, further development is apparent. Interactions and
invitations are now much more equal, meaning that each infant is more able to
give the other turns in their interactive strategies. Indifference also occurs, with
the same level as that of 6 months, but somehow emotions seem very much
more well-regulated. But, at 9 months, when infants already know each other
from several previous meetings, they seem to be prone to indifference. This
indifference is not just a shift of attention to another object, but a expression of
withdrawal from the other, shown by behaviours like 'still-face", vocalisations
directed to the self, eyes gazing the ceiling, and so. Girls were once again, found
to be superior than boys in interactive patterns and emotional expression.
A very important element evident in all ages is the communicative use
of imitation. Imitation is present in all ages, in all studies, and at a very
significant rate. It seems that infants use imitations to help the interactions in all
situations: to start it, to keep it going, and even to restore interaction, when it is
failing12.
Another important element is the very low rate of active negative
emotions, like irritation. An explanation for this is that before the first year,
when facing another infant, infants seem prone to use positive expressions to
negotiate an interaction. A smiling face, waving and gentle vocalisations seem
12 This point will receive a deeper analysis later.
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to be a very effective way of gaining the other's attention. Whether or not this is
a general characteristic, other research in other situations must show. No
physical contact was allowed in this research, and no toys were shared.
The results above were obtained in a Cross-Sectional study and were
confirmed by a Longitudinal study.
As for the Mirror study, a very interesting result is that boys seemed
to be more interactive with their images than girls, and they also showed more
positive emotional expressions. This result is opposite to the previous Cross-
Sectional and Longitudinal studies. It seems that in front of their own images,
boys feel more freedom to interact and to show positive emotional expressions.
At all ages, infants are very attentive to their mirror images. Their
images attract them and make them show much richer expressions than when
faced with another infant.
For the Emotional Code both in the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal
studies, just four emotional expressions were distinguished; Curiosity,
Friendliness, Indifference and Irritation. In the Mirror study, however, many
more emotions were coded; including Happiness, Surprise, Self-exploration
(which is not a pure emotional expression, but is so "expressive" that it was
decided that this behaviour should be included in that category), and Shyness.
At all ages, the amount of positive emotional expressions was
superior, as shown also in the previous Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal
studies. It seems that infants before the first year basically make use of positive
expressions when confronted with another, be it another infant or their own
mirror image.
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The presence of clear self-recognition' (coded as self-exploration) as
early as 6 months was of interest. This was not a large proportion of
behaviours; it seems that the infant is fascinated by the image, but does not care
whether it is his/hers or not. Nevertheless, in some situations, the infant is very
surprised to perceive that the moving image of the hand in the mirror is of
his/her own hand. The infant stops, moves the hand, looks at it, looks back to
the mirror, moves the hand again. This lasts few seconds, but the recognition of
the self is there.
It would be very exciting to use a double-TV system to observe how
infants would react to others, because they will have somebody facing them
who is not really there, as if it were a mirror image. But that mirror image will
not react automatically, as a self-image would. Probably, the interactions will be
more similar to the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal studies.
The results shown above are exciting, and many of them were not
obtained before. However, they must be interpreted with care. As explained in
the Purposes section, this is an exploratory methodological study with very few
subjects. There were clearly individual differences, apart from those due to age




The results obtained in this research raise new questions concerning
infant-infant interaction. Some contribute to the discussion concerning gender
differences, and there were unexpected emotional reactions of infants to their
mirror images.
As it was said in the Purposes of this work (chapter I), this was intended
to be a pilot investigation of infant-infant interaction. The results must be seen
as a provisional test of the methodology. It is clear that new research must be
done, to confirm the findings.
The small number of subjects makes some of the conclusions precarious.
Nevertheless, the behaviours observed do confirm the main hypothesis, that
infants, as young as 6 months of age, are capable of communicating with their
peers. A difference between boys and girls was found in emotional expression,
girls being more expressive than boys when confronted with their peers. The
fact that the behaviours of only three girls and six boys were analysed could
lead us to think that maybe this finding merely reflected chance individual
differences, but this result on sex differences is compatible with that obtained by
Maccoby (1980).
1. Infant-Infant Interaction
The results clearly show infants aged 6 to 9 months interacting with
each other, and the interactive patterns are clearly defined. Each knows exactly
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that the infant in front of them is another human being, not a toy, contrary to
Kagan et al (1975), who think that, until 2 years, children are unaware of the
presence of another one. In this study, every infant is clearly aware of being
with the other, and keen to explore the possibilities of sharing experiences. The
fact that communication showed is emotionally toned makes it more
fascinating, because this means that motives are guiding this communication.
These motives for intersubjective exchanges (Trevarthen, 1974, 1979, 1987) are
forming the basis for later friendship and companionship among peers.
According to Tronick (1989), infants experience periods of interactive
errors in normal interactions with caretakers, followed by negative affect and
sympathetic 'repairs', with the transformation of the negative affect to a positive
one. This experience gives the infant experience with the ability to establish
positive interactions, seeing him or herself as effective, and the other as reliable
and trustworthy. I think the same kind of 'error' happens in infant-infant
interaction, although they are not often followed by negative affect. Infants
simply turn their attention to other stimuli in the environment, seeming to
'forget' the other's existence for some time. Interactive repairs seem to be
brought into effect by the 'offending' partner, not by the infant who withdraws
from the interaction. The other infant displays a series of behaviours that were
effective when the interaction started, such as, imitation of behaviours,
vocalisations, body movements, and so on. In most of the situations, these
strategies seem to work, for the avoided infant was successful in restoring the
previous interaction. Interesting, though, that once he (or she), regains the
partner's attention, he (or she) seems to take his (or her) turn, withdrawing from
the interaction. Now it is the other's turn to display the attractive behaviours,
trying to renew the interaction.
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At 6 months, Interacting and Imitating behaviours already exist, but
interactions are not consistent, and they are often interrupted by shifts of
attention. In fact, at 6 months, infants seem constrained to repeat invitations to
their partners, seeking to engage them. They call each others attention, but
together fail to keep the interaction going.
At 8 months, there is an increase in interactive situations, which appears
to show that infants are becoming more able to direct their attention to become
involved with another infant, overcoming the impulse to shift attention away.
Finally, at 9 months, periods of Interacting rise to almost half of all the
interactive situations, clear indicating that infants are now in control of their
interactions.
These results are to be expected, if we accept that as infants grow, their
range of interests is extended, and can be better sustained.
Take as examples of these developments, Ellen and Andrew, a pair of 6-
month-olds (Pictures 1 to 5, below). They were sitting in front of each other, and
Ellen starts to try to call Andrew's attention. He is not very responsive, he is
more interested on a toy that he found in his push-chair. But Ellen insists,
moving her body up and down, making a funny pout, vocalising loudly. He
finally looks at her, who triumphantly goes on with her "showing off", lifting
her legs, and feet, vocalising and smiling. But she gives him a turn, and waits as
he moves his body forward, shakes the toy and smiles. At the end, both are
happily smiling to each other.
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Picture 2: Ellerw-Andrew, 6 months: Invitation (Ellen is still trying to call
Andrew's attention, vocalising loudly; he is looking to his right).
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Picture 3: Ellen+Andrew, 6 months: Interaction (they are looking at each
other and vocalising in turns, moving their bodies).
Picture 4: Ellen+Andrew, 6 months: Interaction (they are looking at each
other; she is "showing off', and he is looking very suspiciously to her).
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Picture 5: Ellerw-Andrew, 6 months: Interaction (this picture shows both
of them "having fun", vocalising and laughing at each other).
Infants' interactions with other infants appear to be regulated by-
sympathetic exchange of expressions, in the same way as infants interactions
with adults. It is clear that they do not need 'scaffolding' of the mothers or other
adult to generate interactions. Jacobson (1981) claims that infants' interaction at
6 months must be mediated by toys. In my experience, this is definitely not the
case. Even at 6 months, pairs of infants were able to share interest and become
involved in a conversation-like behaviours, by means of vocalisations, body
movements and emotional expressions. When, in very few cases, toys were
used, they were made "part of the game", in the sense that infants teased each
other with the help of the toy or used a toy to call the other's attention, but the
same communicative performances were apparent without toys. Actually, in
some situations, toys distracted an infant, who became more interested in the
toy than in the peer.
117
The role of imitation in infants' interaction was made very clear in these
results. Imitation was used to assist interactions, in many different
circumstances, for example:
1) Infants can start a 'conversation of movements' through imitative
behaviour, and, as the interaction progresses, they take turns and a
"conversation" in the form of attuned reciprocal body movements can be
observed. For example, Holly and Monty, at 8 months are facing one another;
the boy looks at the girl and starts to kick and the girl imitates him immediately,
looking at him. He kicks back and she does the same, but vocalises, smiles,
points at him, while he is greatly impressed by the presence of another infant in
front of him and kicks back, vocalising to her (Pictures 6 and 7).
Picture 6: Holly+Monty, 8 months: Imitation (Monty looks at Holly and
starts to kick; she kicks as well).
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Picture 7: Holly+Monty, 8 months: Imitation (Both infants are kicking, at
the same time, and Holly vocalises).
2) Infants use imitation to synchronise their behaviours. This
synchronisation was called sympathetic attunement, in accordance with Stern's
concept (Stern et al, 1985). They make the same movements with their bodies at
the same time. In the above example, in two minutes of interactive situations,
there were 28 imitations, all of them showing such attunements.
3) Imitation is also used to keep the movement-conversation going. At 9
months, Emily and Stuart imitate each other is this sort of movement-
conversation. He kicks and holds his leg up, and she imitates him, but not with
the exactly matching body movements. First, because she is not so "athletic" as
he is (he can put his legs in a higher position than she can) and second, because
as he kicks, he vocalises in a long and loud way ("Tarzan-like"), while she
smiles. As his attention shifts to other things, such as investigating his push¬
chair screws, she tries to call his attention back, kicking and moving her legs up.
She succeeds, because he imitates her and emits his "Tarzan-like" call again
(Pictures 8 to 10).
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Picture 8: Emily+Stuart, 9 months: Imitation (Stuart lifts his legs and holds
them, vocalising. Emily lifts her legs, as well, looking at him).
Picture 9: Emily+Stuart, 9 months: Imitation (Emily kicks her legs, and moves
her right leg up and vocalises, as Stuart is playing with his push-chair straps),
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his legs and vocalises; she points at him, lifts her legs and vocalises, as well).
4) Imitation may serve to express recognition and sympathy. Again,
two 9-month-old infants, a boy and a girl were interacting (Picture 11). He looks
at her, vocalises an "a-haa" sound and waves his hand, jumping in his push¬
chair. She smiles at him and waves back, vocalising a "uu" sound. He laughs at
her and waves back again.
Picture 11: Emily+Angus, 9 months: Sympathy (Angus waves to
Emily and she waves back, smiling and vocalising).
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5) Imitation may also be used to tease or provoke the other. At 9
months, a boy keeps shaking a toy, holding it in front of a girl at the same age
(Pictures 12 and 13). She imitates his hand movements, and vocalises "uu",
pointing as well. As she tries to reach it, he jumps and shakes the toy again,
evidently finding pleasure in provoking her efforts. She also seems to be
pleased, because she keeps smiling and vocalising, showing no distress that she
cannot get the toy (Fiamenghi, 1997).
It is clear, then, that imitation is a very important component of infant-
infant interaction. These results are in accord with those obtained by other
researchers investigating mother-infant imitation (for example, Kugiumuzakis,
1983).
Picture 12: Emily+Adam, 9 months: Teasing (Adam shakes the bally,
and Emily smiles, vocalising).
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'Invitation' was another interesting category of behaviour. It indicates a
tendency to interact, but also in most cases corresponds to a lack of ability to
make interactions contrive to operate. It is a very effective behaviour, though,
and infants at 6 months use it most of the time. In fact, that seems to be one
importance difference between infant-infant and adult-infant behaviour
interactions. Many researchers (Fogel & Hannan 1985; Kaye & Fogel, 1980;
Maratos, 1973,1979; Meltzoff & Moore, 1989; Nadel & Fontaine, 1989; Nakano,
1994; Trevarthen, 1974,1984,1987,1990,1993; Vinter, 1985; Weinberg & Tronick,
1994) have shown that mothers are very effective in keeping an interaction
going.
I conclude that basically, there is no qualitative difference in motivation
between infant-adult interaction and infant-infant interaction. Infant-infant
interactions follow certain of the same patterns as those reported for infant-
adult interactions, such as mutual attunement, synchronised timing of
Picture 13: Emily+Adam, 9 months: Teasing (Emily points at the ball,
again, and Adam smiles and shakes it).
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behaviours, turn-taking and empathy of feelings. However, adults are certainly
more efficient in creating and maintaining topics (Nakano, 1995). Topic, here, is
used in the sense of an object or action of shared interest. For example, the
mother can call the infant's attention by showing him or her a toy and shaking it
in front of his or her eyes, smiling and vocalising. Because of that, infant-infant
interactions will be less frequent, and much more shorter, than adult-infant
interactions, especially at earlier ages. When confronted by adults, infants are
encouraged to keep their attention to the adult by the adult's efforts. A parent
will persistently call the infant's attention, inviting with smiles and vocalisations
and trying to keep his or her gaze, adopting new strategies if the infant turns
away. Maybe, then, mothers are more capable of turning their invitations into
effective interactions.
Because infants cannot create as many topics as adults, many of their
invitations fail to attract or sustain interactions. Sometimes, the infants use
vocalisations, that were called Determined, in the sense that they persistently try
to attract the other infant's attention. These vocalisations are longer and louder
than the ones that seem to be used to call the other's attention (called Attention).
In general, they start with an Attention call, but, if it does not succeed, they can
use the Determined one. But, even these stronger attempts fail in many
situations, due to the infants inability to create a new attractive topic for their
partner once they have succeeded in attracting the partner's attention. As age
progresses, infants seem to be more able to create and/or pick up topics, and, in
fact, at 9 months interactions and invitations are effectively combined, meaning
that at this age infants invite and are successful in obtaining an interactive
response to their invitations.
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2. Emotional interactions
There is a clear predominance of positive over negative emotions in
these infant-infant interactions. Actually, infants showed more than twice as
many positive emotions as negative ones. And, even in the case of negative
emotions, the most common was 'Indifference'. No aggressive or angry
emotional reaction was recorded.
As could be expected, emotional responses increase with age between 6
and 9 months. There was a drop at 8 months, though. This drop may have been
due to special characteristics of the sample, but also could mean that at eight
months, infants are experiencing a transition, a 'difficult period', with less
external displays of emotion towards another infant, although remaining
interested in exploring their environment.
The results of the Longitudinal Study were different. In that study, as
age progresses, from 6 to 9 months, emotional expressions decreased, with an
increase of 'Indifference', which did not appear in the Cross-Sectional Study.
The explanation may reside in the fact that, in contrast to the Cross-Sectional
Study, where infants were seeing each other for the first and only time, in the
Longitudinal Study infants already recognised one another by 9 months. They
were not attracted by the novelty of the other infant and reacted with
indifference. They still showed curiosity and friendliness, but indifference was
predominant in 9 months. Actually, a comparable result was also reported by
Jacobson (1981), studying peer-peer-object interactions with toddlers. He
concluded that "infants engaged in more manipulative play and less social
interaction when the familiar peer was present", and "interest in toys is
apparently diminished, in turn, by the presence of a novel peer" (p.623).
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An important result was the fact that aggressive expressions were not
recorded in any of the studies. In fact, the most aggressive of the emotional
expressions recorded was irritation, but even so, it appeared in a small amount.
It seems that, at 6 months, infants are not, in this situation, in complete
control of their emotional system, or of the circumstances to which they have
emotional reactions. They shift from one emotion to another very quickly. As
age progresses, they tend to maintain a positive emotional state. It was
interesting to see that infants seem to use positive expressions in the majority of
interactive situations with other infants. For some reason, up to 9 months,
aggressive behaviours are not expressed very much, and the only negative
reaction was indifference, which is a fairly passive avoidant emotion.
If these results can be generalised, then there is an interest to know
when children start to use aggressive behaviours towards other children. On
the other hand, in this study, infants were not in physical contact with each
other. They were strapped on their push-chairs, out of reach of each other.
Aggression may occur when infants invade each other's 'territory', getting hold
of the other's toy, or touching the other's body. But, Hay, Nash & Pedersen
(1983), studying 6-month-old infants interacting with each other also observed
very little negative reaction to being touched by another infant. In fact, the
infant's reaction to being touched was to touch back. This absence of negative
reactions in their research is in agreement with the results of this thesis.
Tronick (1989) proposes that infants' emotions play a critical part in an
evaluation of their goals. For instance, emotions motivate the infant to react
when attainment of a goal is hindered by an obstacle, causing them to remove it.
Tronick believes that the emotion does not disorganise behaviour, but instead
organises it. In some ways, the results of this thesis agree with that
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interpretation. The subjects never showed any disorganisation in their
behaviours when interacting with others. It seems that emotions are helpful in
engaging the infant in interactions with peers. They effectively serve a social-
regulatory function (Trevarthen, 1985).
On the other hand the results are completely contrary to the
conclusions of Eckerman & Stein (1990). These authors believe that, before two
years of age, infants seldom coordinate their actions to the specific actions of
their partners. The subjects in this thesis are all much younger than two years.
Even at six months they showed coordination in responding to their partners'
communicative requests.
Trevarthen (1993b) says that "for a partner seeking communication, the
features of the subject's motivation become symptoms of the inner psychological
activity of the individual who is generating and coordinating them" (p.126).
That is what seems to have happened with the subjects of this study. As the
other infant shows any behaviour towards the other, it is immediately perceived
and responded to, in a sympathetically synchronised mode, by the infant who is
seeking communication. He (or she) reacts in an integrated way, emotionally
attuned to the needs of the other, who, in turn, will respond again, and thus a
smooth communication of motive states is accomplished between them. No
matter what kind of behaviour is displayed, the other infant seems to
understand its emotive meaning immediately, and reacts precisely to it. When
he (or she) fails, communication is interrupted. But, having learned how the
other is, he (or she) can restore the interaction, by using some common "sign"
that was previously shared (such as kicking, vocalising, smiling, waving, and so
on). This is a sharing of inner motives, and emotions are playing their part as
effective communicative regulators of self-other relations (Trevarthen, 1993a).
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3. Gender Differences
The results show that a difference between boys and girls in their
interactive patterns. Girls seem to interact more, to imitate more and to try to
initiate an interaction more than boys do. There are certainly individual
differences, as well. Some boys interacted more than others, but the 3 girls were
significantly more interactive than all boys. When interactions between boys are
compared with interactions between boys and girls, the results show almost no
communicative responses for boys with boys. In fact, only two boys interacted
with each other in three age groups all groups13. In truth, gender differences
were not a main concern of this thesis, nor was it intended to analyse them. But,
when the statistics were done, the model revealed by the loglinear analysis
included gender as a significant factor, meaning that gender played an
important role in the results. Gender was, then, a point of discussion for this
thesis.
Differences between boys and girls also happened in relation to the
emotional expressions showed by the infants. In all categories, girls were more
expressive than boys, showing more curiosity and friendliness, as well as
indifference.
Gender differences is a very polemical issue, basically because people
tend to believe that in any fair appraisal differences must be due to cultural
factors. In fact, culture cannot be forgotten when considering gender differences
13As there was just one girl-girl dyad, in the Longitudinal Study, it is
impossible to make reliable comparisons. Nevertheless, it is suggestive that
these two girls were more interactive than any of the situations when boys
interacted with boys.
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(and, maybe thus is true of all psychological constructs), but there are probably
innate characteristics that could account for differences in infants' interactions.
Feminist theorists totally reject any suggestions of an innate basis of
gender differences. Chodorow (1978), referring to studies that show a biological
basis for gender differences, says that "even if we want to read these studies as
supporting or even partially supporting a biological argument, the conclusions
we can draw say nothing about the effects of female hormones on maternal
behaviour, feelings or preferences. They suggest only that male hormones may
suppress maternalism" (p.25). Basow (1992), also from a feminist standpoint,
says that there is no evidence for gender differences, because gender is
constructed by every socialising agent in society.
The subjects here, however, were too young to be influenced by social
roles. Even though it could be argued that even infants observe their parents'
behaviours and reactions to the world and to their children, it is very difficult to
believe that a 6-month-old, who has never been interacting with another baby
before, would apply this experience, generalising to the infant from experience
of adults. Besides, how do they know that the other is a girl or a boy? This is
probably not a category that infants have developed yet at the ages this study
includes. It would appear that feminist justifications for gender differences do
not apply here.
The differences in gender that were found here seem to agree with
Maccoby (1990), who believes that interactive behaviour is not just situationally
specific, but it depends on the gender category membership of the participants.
There are, in fact, many possibilities that could explain those differences
between boys and girls in this small sample. The first could be individual
differences among boys and girls. This is something to consider. Nevertheless,
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the same pattern of gender differences was found in both Longitudinal and
Cross-Sectional studies, which is a sign that gender is playing a part in the
interactive patterns of the infants.
Another explanation could be the ways mothers behave with boys and
girls. Lindahl & Heimann (1995) concluded that mother-daughter interactions
are characterised by a higher degree of social proximity than mother-son
interactions. If social proximity is an indication of the quality of social
interaction, this could account for the higher degree of interactive behaviours
showed by the girls in this study. Mothers may stimulate more interactive
behaviours in their daughters, who will show more of these behaviours when
relating to other infants. And as these interactions with mothers are affectively
toned, girls will also be more expressive in their emotions to others infants.
The fact remains that gender differences occurred, both in Interactions
and in Emotions. Gender differences were not the main concern of this thesis.
Clearly, further research should carefully address this problem more
specifically, from the beginning, structuring the samples with a similar number
of boys and girls.
4. Mirror interactions
Contrary to the Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal studies, where
observations followed a strict methodology, the Mirror study was a very free
procedure, and, as a result, some interesting discussions can be made of it.
In first place, interactions of infants with their own image were the most
frequent behaviours. Very few 'distractions' were recorded, contrary to the
previous studies of infant-infant interactions, which were punctuated by
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withdrawals. It seems that the mirror attracts infants' attention and, even at 6
months, they will spend a considerable amount of time exploring their own
images in the mirror.
Another difference from infant-infant interaction is that boys are more
interactive than girls, when facing a mirror. This is an unexpected result -
common sense might lead one to expect that women spend more time than men
in front of the mirror! This is not true, at least for infants.
As to emotional expressions, if only positive ones are considered, boys
are more expressive than girls when confronted with a mirror image, although
girls cover a broader spectrum of emotional expressions. No boy showed
'shyness', and this result seem to be in accordance with Lewis et al (1989). In his
study, he found that females showed more 'embarrassment' than males.
An interesting result was that, at 9 months, no negative expression was
recorded.
A controversial point concerns to the concept of self-awareness, or self-
recognition. The majority of authors consider that self-recognition develops
after the baby is at least 18 months old, and the sign for this is that the child
touches the nose, when it has been previously marked, surreptitiously, with a
rouge dot. Amsterdam (1972) claims that it is highly unlikely that a child will
touch the face of another child if one with a spot on the face appeared in front of
him or her. The question here is why is this unlikely? The test of a child
touching his (or her) own face when it has been marked with a dot proves that
the child recognises the dot, not himself (or herself). Maybe the child finds it
strange to see a mark on his or her nose and then touches it, because he or she
knows that the dot should not be there, because of prior experiences of self-
recognition.
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According to Zazzo (1993), at 12 months, although infants play with the
mirror image of their hands, they do not recognise themselves. He considers the
nose dot touching as a criterion for self-recognition. How can the baby
recognise his (or her) own hands and not recognise them as part of himself (or
herself)? Even if the reaction is simply to a moving object at first, the infant will
soon become aware of the difference between an event that is independent of his
or her movements and one that is strictly related to them. Only if one considers
that self-recognition must be a consequence of a cognitive system that takes
more than a year to develop.
Pictures 15 to 18 show an 8 month-old boy looking in astonishment as
he recognises his own hand in the mirror. It is clear that he is interested in
comparing the two ways of perceiving his hand move.
Picture 14: Thomas, 8 months (he is moving his
hand and looking at the mirror image).
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Picture 15: Thomas, 8 months (he opens his
hand and stares at the mirror image).
Picture 16: Thomas, 8 months (he looks at his
hand, showing surprise, eyes wide opened).
hand, still seeming surprised).
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Picture 18: Thomas, 8 months (he looks back at
the mirror image).
In this study, infants were considered to be recognising themselves in
various situations, when they were looking at parts of their bodies (mainly
hands) reflected in the mirror, and suddenly looked to the real body part and
moved it and looked back to the mirror image and back to the body part. I
Lewis et al (1989) argue that specific cognitive skills are necessary for the
emergence of secondary emotions, like embarrassment, for example. But Reddy
(1992) has shown that shyness can be observed in 2 month-old infants. And, in
this thesis, an 8 month-old girl, Holly shows what was called "shyness": after
looking at the image of her own moving hands reflected in the mirror, looking
back at the hands, still moving them, and then, looking at the mirror, she covers
herself with some clothes and toys that were in the push-chair, hiding herself
(Pictures 19 to 21). According to Lewis et al, she could not do that, because she
does not have the cognitive skills yet. But she does. The explanation, then, is
that emotional awareness is not dependant on cognition. Stern (1985) claims
that a sense of 'self is present from birth. And, with it, a sense of other. Infants
do not have to learn how to differentiate themselves from the mothers. They are
already differentiated.
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Picture 19: Holly, 8 months: Shv (she covers herself with a cloth)
Picture 19: Holly, 8 months: Shy (she now uses a soft toy to cover
herself).
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Picture 20: Holly, 8 months: Shy (she is now completely hidden).
Other pictures showing infants in happy interactions with their mirror




This thesis aimed to investigate a new methodology for the study of
infant-infant interaction and to observe what happens when infants are facing
other infants, without any other stimulus. Both Cross-Sectional and
Longitudinal observations were made, covering the age range from 6 months to
9 months. It has shown that infants can interact with each other from an early
age (6 months), and that interactions are punctuated by imitations and
emotional expressions, such as those of curiosity, friendliness, indifference and
irritation. Also, it has shown that an infant does not need a mother's
behavioural 'scaffolding' to communicate.
It seems that infants prefer a friendly approach when interacting with
other infants, expressing positive emotions by smiles, laughs, wavings, and also
by imitating the behaviours of the other. As far as gender differences are
concerned, girls appear to be more interactive than boys, and also to show more
emotional expressions. These conclusions appear to be supported by both the
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies.
The fact that no aggressive behaviours were recorded may be due to the
methodology; infants facing one another strapped to their push-chairs cannot
directly act to make aggressive contact with aggression, but they could have
tried, and this never happened.
A mirror study also showed a number of interesting results. Boys were
more interactive with their own image than boys, but girls showed a greater
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variety of emotional expressions. On the other hand, boys were more positive
in their emotional expressions when facing their mirror image.
As was explained in the previous chapter, mirror studies with infants,
children, primates, and even with dolphins, have always been primarily
concerned with a test of self-recognition, based on evidence of awareness of the
location of at 'nose dot'. The age at which children begin to recognise
themselves as the person reflected in the mirror has been determined by
recording when a child seeks to touch or remove a dot that has been covertly
placed on the child's nose.
William James (1892) is credited with having established the
foundations of the study of the self in Psychology, with the differentiation
between 'I' and 'Me'. In James' theory, 'I' systematises and clarifies the subject's
experience 'subjectively' - this experience is continuous over time and specific in
comparison with others, providing the subject with a distinct identity. 'Me' is
the object of the subject's perception when he or she reflects on himself or
herself, including all categories that are used to define the subject in society,
such as by age, gender, race, and so on.
However, it was Mead's theory (1934) that has given support for the
current view in the study of the self. According to his argument, infants are not
born with a self:
"The self is something which has a development, it is not initially
there at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and
activity, that is, develops in a given individual as a result of his
relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within
that process".
(Mead, 1934, p. 135)
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Although Mead was more concerned to acknowledge society as the
fundamental source for the structure of the mature self, psychological
researchers since his time have preferred to focus on the first more hypothetical
part of his statement, that infants do not have a self at birth. As a consequence
of this hypothesis, mirror self-recognition has been assumed to be only possible
after the child has developed some kind of reasoning, a reflection of experience,
which must happen after infancy, probably after the second year, as language is
acquired. Thus, the preferred definition of self-recognition in contemporary
developmental Psychology and the methodology used to test it, has disregarded
the importance of affectively regulated relationships of awareness of the other.
It is curious that researchers seek to attribute self-recognition in this way
to highly social species such as humans, primates and dolphins, failing to
perceive that these animals' 'selves' are connected to the group in which they
belong, as indeed, the researchers point out (Hauser et al, 1997; Marten &
Psarakos, 1995; Tobach et al, 1997). In the case of humans, our sense of self is
intimately connected to our relation to the others, and an awareness of the
'other' in the mirror is a good example of this essential sense of relatedeness in
dynamic interaction.
In the mirror test of this thesis, infants were clearly observing their own
behaviours and interacting with their own images. They were certainly
interested in the effects that their behaviours had upon themselves and
potentially on the others, because they showed socially significant emotions, like
'shyness', 'shocked surprise', 'friendliness', for example, which as just the kind of
expressions that are displayed in animated interactions with other persons.
Therefore, I would suggest that the interactive emotional behaviour displayed
by an infant in front of a mirror is the way of being aware of himself or herself,
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but also it is a reflection of the natural awareness of the other. In fact, this view
is shared by Reddy (1994), who believes that self-awareness is only possible in
the context of other-awareness. Without the other, indeed, there is no
possibility of self-awareness, or self-appraisal. As Adam Smith (1759/1982)
explains, with perfect clarity, the self is in relation with the other who is aware
of us:
"We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and
endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce
upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some
measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinise the propriety of
our own conduct".
(Smith, 1759/1982, p. 112).
This thesis has employed a small number of subjects and there are
different numbers of boys and girls. Clearly the results will be affected by the
considerable individual differences between infants, both as to consistent
temperamental diversity and patterns of development. Nevertheless, individual
differences or not, the behaviours indicative of intersubjective recognition
occurred, and differences observed between infants at distinct ages and between
boys and girls do appear to give evidence suggesting that the results of this
thesis would be confirmed in larger groups of subjects.
Psychology lacks agreement about the theoretical framework to analyse
the phenomena of behaviour. As a result, partial views of reality are offered as
if they were the total reality. Because of a bias of this kind, which can even take
the form of an obstinate refusal to see what is there to be seen, many researchers
have failed to replicate the results claimed by previous studies of the
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communicative abilities of infants and, as a consequence, it has been decided
that the behaviours claimed were not feasible. I believe that such narrow-
mindedness cannot be justified in a science which deals with the behaviours of
human beings, changeable and multifarious as these are. Psychologists should
be the first to recognise that a more flexible approach is needed to observe
human beings correctly.
Maybe because we live in a highly pragmatic western culture, we have a
tendency to dichotomise everything. There is a feeling of security when things
are taken to be either "black" or "white", "left" or "right", for then we can
comfortably situate ourselves in one of the two positions, leaving no space for
doubt. As a result, the history of Psychology is torn by opposite theories, like
Structuralism X Functionalism; Behaviourism X Psychoanalysis; and, more
recently, Cognitive-computational theories against Innateness and Cultural
theories. The question here is, does it have to be like that? Why can't we
integrate different positions into a broader theory? Divisions in science are
necessary, because we cannot study everything at the same time, as an ancient
Greek philosopher might have felt he could do. But, we cannot forget that
divisions are convenient fictions, because a human being lives as a totality and
must in the end be considered as such.
I think the findings of this thesis can support a new way of working in
Education, leading to further consideration of the differences between a
computationalist versus culturalist theories, which are clear, as Bruner (1996)
has pointed out.
A computational approach retains old instructive theories of teaching
and learning; then, it analyses strategies of problem solving, redescribing them
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in computational terms, applying them to human brain, which is supposed to
act in the same way as a computer.
The culturalist view, on the other hand, knows that education is part of
culture, and questions the functions of education within the culture. After that,
it has to ask why education is placed in culture as it is, and, as a result, it
analyses the natural resources and constraints imposed on the process of
education.
Computationalism is interested in all ways in which information is
organised and used, whereas culturalism concentrates on how human beings in
cultural communities create and transfer meanings.
According to Bruner (1996), culturalism can benefit from the insights of
computationalism, except for the fact that "processes of human meaning making
cannot be ruled out" (p.12). This way, culturalism is more involved with
intersubjectivitv. The possibility of having works done together between
humans "...creates shared and negotiable ways of thinking in a group..."
(Bruner, 1996, p.23). The consequent externalisation produces a record of our
mental efforts, outside us, not in our memory. This can also be shared and
modified, creating new models.
On the other hand, it is simply not true that cognitivism can permit us
to do without emotions and feelings. In fact, the problem is to know which
controls which: emotion or cognition.
This digression is needed to discuss the results of this thesis. It is based
on an intersubjective theory of child development, but it also recognises the
importance of cognitive factors in that development, although it is not directly
addressing them. The results of this thesis, however, point in a direction that is
nearer to a culturalist approach.
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They could be of use in many different fields, not only as a basis for new
psychological research, but also in clinical and educational settings. The first
interest to follow in future research would be to investigate even younger
infants interacting with each other. The hypothesis of an innate basis for
intersubjective exchanges, for which there is evidence from studies of neonatal
communication and protoconversation with infants under 3 months of age,
leads to the expectation that younger infants might recognise their peers as
partners in intersubjectivity. A second research interest would be to observe the
evolution of the interactive patterns with older infants and toddlers. This would
bring information on the emergence of aggressive behaviours, not registered in
this thesis, on peer choices or friendships, and another more complex social
behaviours. The use of the Double-TV System of Murray and Trevarthen would
be a powerful technique to observe detailed infant-infant interactions.
A clinical and educational application of this thesis would be the work
with children with disabilities. If interactions start at early ages, and if infants
use imitations and positive emotional expressions to interact with each other,
early social intervention could be used to facilitate psychological development,
that is, by mixing children with disabilities with non-handicapped ones and
permitting them to interact. This would probably help to improve the
handicapped child's self-esteem, companionship, and ways of coping with
physical and intellectual disabilities, and also permit all the children disabled
and non-disabled to develop an accepting attitude in a non-prejudicial
environment.
Studying gender and temperament differences is clearly an important
additional issue in Education. If girls and boys behave in different ways even as
infants, because they have different temperaments and social interests, then an
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Educational system should help to develop individual strengths and prevent
disadvantage.
It would seem that considerations about intersubjective interactions are





Letters sent to Subjects's Parents inviting them to take part in the Study
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Edinburgh, 12 April 1995
Dear Mr & Mrs
I'm carrying out research with Professor Colwyn Trevarthen on infants'
emotional communication at the Department of Psychology, U. of Edinburgh.
Your name was given to me as a parent who might be willing to let me
work with your son (daughter) as a research subject. I am looking for
babies from 2 to 9 months of age.
I would like to have an opportunity to talk to you to explain my research
project and the equipment used, but basically I will videotape two infants looking at
each other through a Television system. Probably, the recordings will not last more
than 15-20 minutes.
If you are interested in helping in this research, please phone me at the
University: the number is 650 3435. My name is Geraldo Fiamenghi.









Examples of the Application of the Coding System Illustrating the
Different Codes Applied, in each case, to 1 Minute of Interaction
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Ellen+Andrew, 6 months. Behavioural Code
Time (s) Andrew Ellen Dur. j
3 Eg Eg; "Ae 2 |
5 Ed Eg 2
6 Be; Vf Eg;XP 1
9 Eg Eg; Au 3
10 Er Eg 1
12 El Eg; Xs; Va 2
13 Eg Eg; Xs; Va 1
15 Eg Eg; Xs; Va; Ad 2
16 Eg Ed 1
17 Eg Bu; El 1
21 M Eg 4
22 Eg Er; Vf 1
23 Ed; As Eg; Lu 1
26 Eg Ed; As 3
29 Eg Ed; As 3
30 ,Eg Lu; Au 1
32 Eg Bu; Vs 2
35 Eg Bu; Vs 3
38 Eg Bu; Xs 3
42 Eg Xc; Eg; Lu 4
44 Eg Eg; Va; Lm; Ga 2
46 Eg; Xs Br; Be 2 1
49 'Eg Eg; Lu; Ga 3
50 Er El; Lu 1
51 Eu Eu 1
55 Ed Em 4
57 Eg Em; Xs; Va 2 !
58 Eg Eg; Xs; Va 1
60 Eg Eg; Xs; Lm; Au 2
Codes:
Ad: hands down; Ae: hold ear; As: hold straps; Au: hands up; Be: j
escape; Br: move body to the right; Bu; move body up; Eg: gaze; Ed: j
look down; El: look to the left; Er: look to the right; Eu: look up; Ga: i
move hand in any direction; Lm: legs move left; Lu: legs move up; Va::
| vocalisationof attention; Vd: vocalisation determined; Vf: vocalisation j
fussy; Vs: vocalisation self-centred; Xp: pout; Xs: smile. j
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Ellen+Andrew. 6 months. Functional Code
Time Andrew Ellen
3 OB OB; BE
5 WI OB
6 BE; VO OB; IR
9 OB OB; BE
10 WI OB
12 WI OB; FR; VO
13 OB OB; FR; VO
15 OB OB; FR; VO; BE
16 OB WI |
17 OB BE; WI
21 OB OB
22 OB WI; VO
23 WI; BE OB; BE
26 OB WI; BE
29 OB WI; BE
30 OB BE; BE
32 OB BE; VO
35 OB BE; VO
38 OB BE; FR
42 OB FR; OB; BE
44 OB OB; VO; BE; BE
46 OB; FR p__
49 OB OB; BE; BE
50 WI WI; BE
51 WI WI
55 WI WI
57 OB WI; FR; VO
58 OB OB; FR; VO
60 OB OB; FR; BE; BE
Codes:
BE: Body Expressions; FR: Friendy; VO:
Vocalisations; OB: Observant; WI: Withdrawal;
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Ellen+Andrew, 6 months, Negotiatorv Code
Time Andrew Ellen Code
3 L Inv Inv
5 Non L Non
6 Non Non Non
9 L Inv Inv
10 Non L Non
12 Non Inv Non
13 L Inv Inv
15 L Inv Inv
16 L Non Non
17 L Non Non
21 L L L
22 L Non Non
23 Non Inv Non
26 L Non Non
29 L Non Non
30 L Inv Inv
32 L Non Non
35 L Non Non
38 L Inv Inv
42 L Inv Inv
44 L Inv Inv
46 Inv Non Non
49 L Inv Inv
50 Non Non Non
51 Non Non Non
55 Non Non Non
57 L Non Non
58 L Inv Inv
60 L Inv Inv
Codes:
Inv: Invitation; L: Look; Non: Non-interaction
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Ellen+Andrew. 6 months. Emotional Code
Time Andrew Ellen
3 Curios. Curios.; Friend.
5 Indiff. Curios.
6 Irrit. Curios.; Irrit.
9 Curios. Curios.; Friend.
10 Indiff. Curios.
12 Indiff. Curios.; Friend.
13 Curios. Curios.; Friend.




22 Curios. Indiff.; Irrit.







42 Curios. Curios.; Friend.
44 Curios. Curios.; Friend.
46 Curios.; Friend. Indiff.




57 Curios. Indiff.; Friend.
58 Curios. Curios.; Friend.
60 Curios. Curios.; Friend.
Codes:
Curios.: Curiosity; Friend. : Friendliness; Indiff. : Indifference
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Emily, 9 months. Mirror Study
Time Behaviour Expression Dur.
1 Eg; Xs; Be Happy 2
3 Ed; Hd; Mm Attentive 3
6 Ed; Vo; Hd Happy 3
8 Eg; Bs Friendly 5
12 Eg; Xs; Gw Happy 2
15 Eg; Mm; Aj Attentive 3
17 Em; Aj Coy 2
24 Ed; Xs; Attentive 4
28 Ed; Gt Happy 3
31 Ef; Gs Attentive 2
39 Ed; Xp Attentive 7
44 Eg; Mc Happy 4
47 Eg; Mc; Xs Happy 3
50 Eg; Mc; Xs; Xk Happy 8
55 Eg; Xs; Ga; Xk Happy 5
58 Eg; Xs; Xk; Gc Happy 3
68 Eg; Mm; Attentive 3
72 Eg; Am; Surprised 5
74 Eg; Gt; Vo Friendly 3
75 Eg; Mo Surprised 10
77 Eg; Xs; Vo Friendly 4
79 Eg; Vo; Aj Friendly 2
81 Eg; Xs; Ga Happy 1
93 Eg; Xs; Xh Happy 2
98 Er; Aj; Xs Happy 2
101 Er; Aj; Mm Attentive 2
103 Er Attentive 12
115 Em; Xs; Am; Vo Happy 5
120 Be; Vo Happy 4
Codes:
Am: hands in the mouth; Aj: hands joined; Be: crawl; Bs: stand up: Ed:
look down; Eg: gaze; Em: look at mum; Er: look at right; Ga: move hand;
Gs: take the socks off; Gt: touch the mirror; Gw: wave; Hd: head moves
down; Vo: vocalisation; Mc: chew; Mm: close mouth; Xk: send kisses;




Sequence showing Emily. 9 months, playing with her own image
 
Sequence showing Stuart. 9 months, playing with his own image
Sequence showing Holly, 8 months, protruding her tongue,






INTERSUBJECT1V1TY AND INFANT-INFANT INTERACTION
IMITATION AS A WAY OF MAKING CONTACT
Geraldo A. Fiamenghi, Jr.





Research and Clinical Center for Child Development
Facility of Education. Hokkaido University
Sapporo. Japan
25
1NTERSUBJECTIVITY AND INFANT-INFANT INTERACTION :
IMITATION AS A WAY OF MAKING CONTACT
Geraido A. Fiamenghi, Jr.1
Catholic University of Campinas-Brazil and University of Edinburgh-Scotland
Developmental psychology has traditionally assumed that young infants are born
without a capacity for psychological interaction, showing only reflexes in response to
the environment triggered by their internal bodily or self-regulatory needs. For exam¬
ple, as a result of Piaget's (1952, 1954, 1962) view of infants'' developmental
egocentrism, infants under one year were considered incapable of communicating with
others of the same age. For many years, Piaget's ideas were prevalent and uncha¬
llenged in child developmental research.
Recently, however, these views have been questioned and some researchers have
seen the infant's relationship with others as a manifestation of what is called intersub-
jectivity — a psychological capacity for recognising and communicating with psychologi¬
cal states of other individuals.
This alternative view, in fact, is not new outside psychology. Actually, the con¬
cept of human intersubjectivity has long been the central interest in Philosophy, and in
Religion.
For example, such a way of thinking was clearly articulated in Existentialism.
Sartre (1970) considered that one's existence couid only be 'justified' by the state of
existence of the other. Without him or her, I would not exist:
Pour obtenir une verite quelconque sur moi. il fault que je passe par lautre. Lautre
est indispensable a mon existence. Ainsi, decouvrons-nous tout ae suite un monde
que nous appellerons 1'intersubjectivite et cest dans ce monde que lhomme decide ce
qu'il est et ce que sont ies autres.
(Sartre, 1970, p. 67)3
Buber (1947) considered the individual in relation to the other in a dialogue.
For him. the relationship was " in-between " the one and the other, between two per-
; This paper is part of the author's Ph.D. thesis in Psychology at the University of Edinburgh.
- " In order to grasp some truth about myself, it is imperative that I pass by way of the
other. The other is vital to my existance. Therewith, we quickly discover a world that




There is a genuine dialogue-no matter whether spoken or silent-where each of the
participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular
being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relation
between himseif and them.
(Buber, 1947, p. 19)
Although this conception of human relations is also present in the works of
Bateson (1973), Bruner (1977, 1990), and Stern (1985), among others, this view of
human inter-relationship has been stressed most strongly and denned through analysis
of mother-infant interactions by Trevarthen (1974, 1984, 1987, 1990. 1993).
Primary intersubjectivity has been denned as the immediate experience of sharing
subjective states (Trevarthen, 1979) and secondary intersubjectivity as the search for
sharing of experiences about events and things (Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978)
According to Trevarthen (1993), intersubjective encounters become "psychologi¬
cal interactions between selves " (p. 126).
The concept of intersubjectivity is important for the comprehension of infant's
development because it helps us to see the new-born as a whole motivated being, not
only as a chaotic one, or one made up of reflexes. We are now beginning to under¬
stand that the infant has a mental life, that they are particularly weil-equipped for
sociai life and so that the infant is eager to become part of it. The infant is born
ready for intersubjective exchanges.
We know that empathy of emotions is needed for communication because, emo¬
tion is part of the meaning that the situation has tor the individual and aiso pan of the
message for the others. Empathy in the relationship between mother and infant
appears to be the foundation for modulation of relationships to others that will develop
afterwards. The first relationship, usually with the mother, is remarkable for the
intensity with which it is affectively toned. It surely has a specially emotive and self-
reguiating quality for the infant (Schore, 1994).
Timing of expressions is an element that serves as a foundation for sympathetic
engagement between mothers and infants. Beebe (1982) who has applied the methods
of ' conversational analysis ' to mother-infant interactions shows that there is a tempo¬
ral organisation, a "coaction" and tum-taking between mother and infant in their non¬
verbal communication. A synchrony develops between expressions of mother and child.
And. surely, this synchrony is one expression of the affective bond between them. We
could say that healthy communication first occurs through affection, that is, through
expression of positive emotion. There is indeed a special rewarding quality, a valence,
in the affection between infant and mother.
According to Trevarthen. emotions are " intrinsically generated, central,
regulatory states of the brain that unify awareness ana co-ordinate activity of a coher¬
ent. mentally active subject" (Trevarthen. 1993. p. 48), and "emotions also communi¬
cate between subjects
He believes that at 2 months, infants are involved in protocortversations, as a first
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step towards communicative exchanges. Protolanguage, then. " requires that a chiid
has a clear differentiation of an integrated self from the worid of others " (Trevarthen.
1987. p. 182). This view agrees with Stern's point that " preverbal senses of self start
to form at birth, if not before" (1985, p. 5).
The study of imitation is a method of demonstrating infants' ability to involve
themselves in intersubjective interaction, because imitation is a direct indicator of sym¬
pathy between persons. It is now proven that imitation exists from birth and many
researchers are exploring all ranges of mother-infant communication and infant's imita¬
tion (Maratos, 1973. 1979; Meltzoff & Moore, 1989; Nadel & Fontaine, 1989; Nadei
& Peze. 1993; Vinter. 1985; etc.).
Peer imitation is a new area for research that is proving the importance of a
shift of interest to intersubiectivity (for example, Hanna & Meltzoff. 1993 ; Patrick &
Richman. 1985). In this situation, infants are involved in relationships with strangers
who are. moreover, no more developed, skilled or sophisticated than themselves.
As Hanna and Meltzoff (1993) suggest, " mutual imitation between two partners
is a principal mechanism for interpersonal communication in infancy, before language.
Toddlers use imitation as basic way to interact and develop social and communicative
ties with one another " (p. 701).
Other authors are studying playing and teasing as a means by which both infants
ana their parents negotiate affective relationships (Nakano, 1994. 1995; Ready. 1991).
Nakano considers benign teasing a way of creating mutual amusement between mother
ana infant. He says that teasing is a very good example of intersubjectivity and that it
contributes to the development of communication.
All of the above studies have brought new insights into the field of human devel¬
opment and emotion.
We have chosen infant-infant interaction as a promising research topic for the
study of first intersubjective encounters.
Very few researchers have concerned themselves with infant-infant interaction.
The studies that we have reviewed do not mention the quality of the intersubjective
exchanges. They were more interested in the quantitative measurement of the behav¬
iour of each individual (which is very curious, if you think that what should be consid¬
ered is the dyad, not the individual).
Although those studies were not primarily concerned with interaction, they did
showed the presence of some degree of involvement between the infants. For example,
it has been observed that new-boms can be distressed and cry when listening to other
babies' crying (Simner. 1971; Sagi & Hoffman. 1976; Martin & Clark. 1982). Others
have anaiysed the relation between pairs of infants and toys (Vandell. Wilson & Bu¬
chanan. 1980) ; recorded the reaction to distress of peers (Hay; Nash & Pedersen.
1981) : ana compared the interaction between mothers and that between peers (Adam-
son & Bakeman, 1985 ; Fogel, 1979).
In our own research, with infants of five months and older, who were seated in
their push-chairs facing each other, out of contact with their mothers and without toys.
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we found many interesting interactions, that demonstrate the intersubjective character¬
istic of awareness present in human beings from early infancy.
The infants used imitation to interact, mainly imitating partial body actions (like
kicking, for example), and it seems that this is a way to call, retain the other's atten¬
tion and resume interactions. It is also very frequently the cause of synchrony between
their behaviours. We prefer to call this mutual engagement attunement (Stern et al,
1985) as this term emphasises the intersubjective nature of their understanding. For
example, both infants at 22 weeks are looking at each other and both simultaneously
move their bodies to their right, then to their left, also lifting their legs. Looking at
their movement, we can see they are timed to synchronise with each other; there is a
precise attunement in their actions.
If we could summarise the uses of imitation in infant-infant communication
(based in our research), the result would be:
1. Pairs of infants use imitation as a means of communicating.
They can start a " conversation of movements " through imitative behaviour, and.
as the interaction progresses, they take turns and we can observe a " conversation "
occurring in the form of attuned body movements.
Take, for example, two 8-month-old infants, a boy and a girl. They have never
met before and are seated on their push-chairs, facing each other. Suddenly, the boy
starts to kick and the girl imitates him immediately. He kicks back and she does the
same, but vocalises, smiles, points at him, who is absolutely stunned by the presence of
another infant in front of him and kicks back, vocalising to her.
2. They synchronise their behaviours. As stated above, we will cail this sympa¬
thetic attunement. They make the same movements with their bodies at the same
time. In the above example, in one minute there were 2 imitations and 5 attunements.
3. Imitation is also used to keep the movement-conversation going. Consider the
case of two 9-month-old infants, a girl and a boy. He kicks and holds his leg up, and
she imitates him. but not with the exactly matching body movements. First, because
she is not so " athietic " as he is (he can put his legs in a higher position than she can
do) and second, because as he kicks, he vocalises in a long and loud way ("Tarzan-
like "), while she smiles. As his attention shifts to other things, such as investigating
his push-chair screws, she tries to cail his attention back, kicking ana moving her legs
up. She succeeds, because he imitates her and emits his " Tarzan-like" call again.
4. Imitation may serve to express recognition and sympathy. For example, two
9-month-old infants, a boy and a girl were interacting. He looks at her. vocalises an
" a-haa " sound ana waves his hand, jumping in his push-chair. She smiles at him and
waves back, vocalising a " uu " sound. He laughs at her ana waves back again.
5. Imitation may also be used to tease or provoke the other. A 9-month-old
boy keeps shaking a toy, holding it in front of a girl at the same age. She imitates his
hand movements, and vocalises " uu". pointing as well. As she tries to reach it. he
jumps ana shakes the toy again, evidently finding pleasure in provoking her efforts.
She also seems to be pieased. because she keeps smiling and vocalising, showing no
distress that she cannot get the toy.
Imitation, then, has many different functions when infants of the same age are
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interacting.
Interactions between infants were found in our study at 5 months.
In general, babies would gaze at each other, showing interest, then smile, kick,
vocaiise or move parts of the body. This was called an invitation for interaction, and
it may or may not excite an answer — the other infant gazes back, moves the body,
smiles, kicks, or vocalises, in response. For instance, a five-month-old girl gazes at a
same age boy, smiles, moves her legs up and down and vocalises. The boy gazes back
very attentively, ana laughs, spitting. Of-course, in many cases, the invitation was not
followed by an interaction. The other infant would only gaze back. An explanation
for the amount of invitation behaviours that were not followed by an interaction is
offered below.
We observe that, at one level there is no difference between infant-adult commu¬
nication and infant-infant communication, although infants with infants interact less
than infants with adults. It seems that the interactions follow certain of the same
patterns. There is comparable mutual attunement, synchronised timing of behaviours,
turn-taking and empathy of feelings. However, adults are certainly more efficient in
creating ana maintaining topics' (Nakano, 1995). Adults will persistently call the
infant's attention, inviting with smiles and vocalisations and trying to keep his or her
gaze, adopting new strategies if the infant turns away. In fact, infants under 6 months
of age keep their attention on one object for a very little time. This is also true in
their interactions with other infants. When confronted by adults, infants are encour¬
aged to keep their attention to the adult by the adult's efforts. Otherwise, the infant
can easily lose interest and shirt attention to other things.
This belief in acults' more developed ability to create topics in communication
with infants does not mean that infants are not able to interact. Infants do interact
with other infants and. although their attention shifts very frequently, they can show
intense interest in another infant from moment to moment.
Concluding, then, we observe imitation to be a very important means of initiating
and maintaining interactions between young infants.
Interaction occurs in short (less than 5 seconds) episodes, probably because
infant's attention is intrinsically unstable. Sometimes, as a result, an invitation for
interaction may not be answered, but the interaction can be resumed when one of them
cails back the other's attention.
Intersubjectivity. the sharing of personal expressive states, permeates ail these
interactive situations, setting the scene for the participants to share and learn mean¬
ings. Intersu'ojective engagement, allows the infants to perceive one another as human
beings who try to make contact and share experiences.
Even infants under one year of age have primary experiences to share. They do
this by snowing body movements, laughing, making funny faces and teasing. This is a
fundamental part of being human.
3 Topic, here, is used in the sense of an object or action of shared interest. For exampie.
the mother can call the infant's attention by showing him or her a toy and shaking it in
front of his or her eyes, smiling ana vocalising.
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Interaction Between Infants: Understanding The Innate Basis for Intersubjectivity
and Emotional Expression
Geraldo Fiamenghi Jr., Department of Psychology, The University of Edinburgh
This research is aimed to clarify the processes of infant intersubjectivity by a nalysing
interactions between same age infants. Although the importance of research on infant-to-
infantemotional expression and communication is obvious, there are few studies investigating
how young infants communicate. Published studies (Fogel, 1979; Hanna & Meltzoff, 1993;
Hay, Nash & Pedersen, 1983; Jacobson, 1981; Maratos, 1979; Mueller & Vandell, 1979;
Sagei & Hoffman, 1976) indicate that emotions can be shared between infants in social
interactions. Even newborns can interact by crying adjusted to the other's cries. We set out
to test the capacity of infants to support protoconversational efforts of their age mates. Pairs
of infants, 4 girls and 8 boys, were videotaped at 20-25 weeks, 31-35 weeks, 36-40 weeks in
same age dyads, seated on push-chairs facing each other. Micro-analysis of the first 2
minutes of interaction has been completed. Four main categories of interactive behaviour
were identified: Interacting, Inviting, Looking and Imitating. Statistical analysis of these will
be reported.
Fogei, A. (1979) Peer- vs. mother-directed behaviour in 1- to 3-month-old infants. Infant
Behaviour and Development, 2: 215-226.
Hanna, E. and Meltzoff, A. (1993) Peer imitation by toddlers in laboratory, home, and day¬
care contexts: Implications for social learning and memory. Developmental Psychology,
29(4): 701-710.
Hay, D., Nash, A. & Pedersen, J. (1983) Interaction between six-month-old peers. Child
Development, 54: 557-562.
Jacobson. J. (1981) The role of inanimate objects in early peer interaction. Child
Development, 52: 618-626.
Maratos, O. (1979) The origin and development of imitation in the first six months of life.
Paper presented at the meeting of the British Psychological Association, Liverpool. April,
1979 Mueller, E. & Vandell, D. (1979) Infant-infant interaction. In: J. Osofskv (Ed.)
Handbook of Infant Development. NY: Wiley.
Sagei. A. & Hoffman. M. (1976) Empathic distress in the newborn. Developmental
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INTERPERSONAL STRESS IN INFANCY: REGULATING
COMPANIONSHIP
TREVARTKEN. C and FIAMENGRL G. A. Jr.
Department of Psychology, The University of Edinburgh, Scnttand, UK.
Some signs of seres? in infancy are a direct result of failed communication. These
indicate uniquely human requirements for self/other regulation. Infants are born
able to engage in dialogic 'protoconv*r*aUnni' and game* with others that are not
related in any direct way to regulation of physiological state. This innate 'inter-
subjectivity' originate* In motives for interpersonai iriierachon that lead to a place
In the cultural world. At one year joint attention serves learning of language and
cultural skills.
When faced with the mother allowing a 'still faca1, or a video replay image of her
speaking, a 2-month-old triea to interact, but withdrawn whe.-t no contingent
response la obtained. The infant may show acute distress. A mother's postnatal
depression may profoundly affect the quality of interaction with her baby.
Problems in cognition. Warning and social adaptation may be detected aa far as d
years after this negative experience, more conspicuously In beys.
Gix-mcnth-oids can engage in inlcr-subjcctivc contact with age-mates, using
imitative, interactive and inviting behaviours. Tnase are emotionally toned,
esprcsaing curiosity and friendliness If the other infant reacts positively. Grt the
other hand, the infant can react negatively, with indifference and irritation, if no
answer Is received. In extreme situations a rejected Infant may cry and avoid.
However, a common restxtnse to frustration when the other Infant avotds contact
is indifference, or shift ot attention elsewhere.
Wore research it needed to understand how infants cope with difficult
interpersonal contacts, and to identify what they are seeking. Early tnreracrions
may provide templates for further patterns of communication. Failure to obtain
contact with significant others, and the resulting stress, can influence future
transactions In interpersonal life. There Is evidence that emotions regulate brain
activity and brain development. However, mechanisms for defence or regulation,
which will be more effective for some individuals than others, can reduce
inter.subjective stress.
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